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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DORE METALS AND MINING
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 900155-CA

vs.
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant/Appellant,
Cross-Appellee.
JURISDICTION
The judgment appealed from was entered June 19, 1989.
(R. 1574-76.)

Defendant served a Motion to Amend Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on June 28, 1989.
1577-81.)

(R.

The trial court denied the motion by Memorandum

Decision entered August 31, 1989.

(R. 1598.) Defendant filed

its Notice of Appeal on September 27, 1989.

(R. 1600-01.)

The Notice of Appeal was timely under Utah R. App. P. 4(b).
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on October 10, 1989.
(R. 1602-03.)

The cross appeal was timely under Utah R. App.

P. 4(d).
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this
case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1990). The Supreme
Court poured this case over to the Court of Appeals as authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1990) . This court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990).

ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Was a party contractually required to extend a loan

to be secured by real property and for which a title insurance
commitment had been issued, where there was an adverse claim
which might affect title to the property, the lender had actual
notice of the claim, and the title insurance commitment would
not insure against such claims, and where the primary purpose
of the contract had been frustrated by the potential borrower's
failure to tender marketable title?

This issue was decided

below on summary judgment, and is reviewed by this Court for
correctness.

Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.

Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989).
B.

In a contract action where the contract contains a

provision for attorney fees to the prevailing party, is a party
who successfully

resists a claim

for rescission

contract entitled to an award of attorney fees?

of that

This is a

question of contract interpretation to be reviewed for correctness. 50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency,
784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989).
C.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in fixing

the attorney fee awarded to the prevailing party, where there
was adequate evidence to support the award, and where there
was evidence that the prevailing party incurred fees far in
excess of the award?

The award is reviewed for abuse of

2

discretion.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988

(Utah 1988) .
D.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding

the prevailing party a fee far less than that actually incurred, where there was no evidence that the fee incurred was
not reasonable and the trial court's allocation of the fee to
various aspects of the case was arbitrary and contrary to the
great weight of the evidence?

The question of whether the

award was supported by the evidence is a question of law, see
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215
(Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990),
although the amount of the award is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

Id. ; Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,

988 (Utah 1988).
E.

In an action on a cost-only contract, did the trial

court err as a matter of law in failing to order repayment of
money paid for purchase of timber, where the undisputed evidence showed that other timber had already been purchased and
not used?

Because the evidence on this issue was not in

substantial dispute, it is reviewed by this Court for correctness.

Richfield v. Walker, 790 P. 2d 87, 89 (Utah Ct. App.

1990).
F.

Did the trial court apply an erroneous legal stand-

ard in ruling on a party's prayer for rescission, in holding
that rescission was precluded by that party having allowed the
breaching party an opportunity to cure the breach, rather than
3

immediately seeking rescission upon learning of the grounds
therefor?

The question of whether the trial court applied the

right legal standard is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness.

Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah

1979).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Appellee is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the issues presented in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is a civil action arising primarily out of a

written contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Plaintiff Dore Metals and Mining Corporation ("Dore")

filed its complaint on August 17, 1983, seeking to recover
possession of various items of equipment alleged to be wrongfully held by defendant United Silver Mines, Inc. ("United")
and for other related relief.

(R. 1-6.)

At a show cause

hearing held September 12, 1983, the parties stipulated that
Dore could recover possession of the equipment upon posting of
a bond for $90,000.00.
bond.

(R. 19.) Dore subsequently posted the

(R. 31-33.)

United

thereafter

filed

its Answer

and Counterclaim

asserting it was entitled to recover charges for storage of
4

the equipment and further asserting it was entitled to damages
for Dore's failure to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit.
(R. 20-30.)
On February 15, 1985, United filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking a determination that Dore had become
obligated to extend to United the $500,000.00 line of credit.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 18, 1985, asserting in essence that United had failed to tender marketable
title to the subject mining properties and had otherwise
breached its obligations under the contract between Dore and
United, and seeking rescission of the contract and damages for
breach of the contract, in addition to recovery of the equipment.

(R. 338-54.) Following substantial discovery addressed

to the issues raised by United7s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Dore filed a response to the motion (R. 794-941),
and filed its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 78788) .
The motions for summary judgment were argued before the
court, Judge Omer J Call, on March 12, 1986 (R. 1045), and on
April 8, 1986, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision
concluding that Dore was entitled to summary judgment absolving it of liability to extend the $500,000.00 line of
credit.

The trial court denied all other aspects of the

motions for summary judgment.

(R. 1051-54, copy in Appendix

A.) A formal Order was entered May 20, 1986 (R. 1063-65, copy
in Appendix

B ) , together

with
5

an Order

Determining Un-

controverted Facts and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 1055-62, copy

in Appendix C.)
Judge Call retired, and the case was ultimately set for
trial before Judge Gordon J. Low commencing June 8, 1988. (R.
1112.)

On May 5, 1988, United moved to vacate the trial date

and to continue the matter pending determination of a case
pending in Idaho, which case had been one of the bases for the
prior grant of summary judgment in the instant case.
18.)

(R. 1117-

Dore responded and asserted that the resolution of the

Idaho case was irrelevant because the prior grant of summary
judgment was now the law of the case and not subject to
modification.

(R. 1152.)

Prior to trial, the defendant

submitted a trial brief which asserted, among other things,
that Judge Call's prior grant of summary judgment was erroneous and should not be considered the law of the case.
1181-1203.)

(R.

At the beginning of trial, Judge Low held that

Judge Call's prior decision was the law of the case and would
not be reconsidered.

(Tr.1 4.)

The case was tried to the court on June 8, 9 and 10, 1988.
The trial court entered a Memorandum Decision on August 31,
1988, finding some issues in favor of Dore and some in favor
of United, and awarding a net judgment to Dore in the sum of
$13,428.80 with the issue of attorney fees reserved for later

Unless otherwise indicated, all transcript citations are
to the transcript of the trial held commencing on June 8, 1988.
6

determination.

(R. 1422-29, copy in Appendix D.)

The parties

submitted affidavits regarding attorney fees (R. 1432-1499;
1506-1553) , and the attorney fee issues were heard by the court
on February 22, 1989.

(R. 1554.)

The trial court entered a

Memorandum Decision on attorney fees on April 3, 1989.

(R.

1557-61, copy in Appendix E.)
Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 156373, copy in Appendix F), and a Judgment (R. 1574-76, copy in
Appendix G) were entered on June 18, 1989.

United thereafter

moved to amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment.

(R. 1577-81.)

The motion to amend was denied by

Memorandum Decision entered August 31, 1989.

(R. 1598.)

United thereafter perfected its appeal (R. 1600-01), and Dore
filed a cross appeal (R.1602-03).
C.

Statement of Facts.
This case focuses on the Vipont Mines, a group of 53

patented

mine

claims

covering

approximately

1,000 acres,

located in the northwest corner of Box Elder County, approximately 1.5 miles from the Idaho border and 10 miles from
the Nevada border.

(Tr. 370-71.)

The mines were discovered

in about 1864 by John and William Vipont.

(Tr. 374.) The mine

passed through several hands, and in 1918 was leased to Robert
Phelan.

(Tr. 375.)

Phelan undertook substantial development

and mined in excess of 3,000,000 ounces of silver and 8,3 00
ounces of gold, making it one of the largest silver mines in
7

the United States at the time.

(Tr. 376.)

Following a drop

in the price of silver, the mine again passed through several
hands, and was ultimately closed in 1942.

(Id.)

Thereafter,

in 1963 and 1964, after an increase in the price of silver,
Thomas F. Miller acquired a leasehold interest in the mines.
(Id.)
Mr. Miller formed defendant United Silver Mines, Inc.
("United"), a Utah corporation, in 1973.

(Tr. 370.)

In 1977,

United sought financing from an individual named Paul Hoffman
and executed with him a certain Limited Partnership Agreement-Vipont Mines, Ltd. (R. 446, 585-600, 1059.

A copy of the

Hoffman Partnership Agreement is attached to United7s brief
herein.)

Title to the Vipont Mines at this time was held by

Bannock Silver Mining Company. Hoffman acquired the outstanding stock of Bannock as part of his obligations to Vipont
Mines, Ltd.

Differences subsequently arose between Hoffman

and United, and Hoffman commenced litigation against United.
(R. 798.)

Hoffman asserted in the litigation against United

that he had contributed substantial sums of money to the
limited partnership, and that he had a 25% interest in the
partnership and further had a valid lien upon the Vipont Mine
property and a claim to 80% of the net proceeds realized from
the processing of the dumps and tailings which are a part of
the Vipont Mine property.

(R. 1059.)

In early 1981, while the litigation with Hoffman was
pending, United sought an infusion of capital from Dore in
8

response to an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal. (Tr.
372.) The negotiations ultimately culminated in the execution
of a Vipont Confirmation Project Agreement
agreement").

("confirmation

(R. 1057, Ex. 2, copy in Appendix H.)

The

confirmation agreement in essence provided that Dore would
undertake a project to confirm whether certain specified
amounts of silver existed in the mine, and granted to Dore an
option to enter into a joint venture with United to develop
the mines.

The agreement contemplated that United would, at

Dore's expense, rehabilitate the A-level adit2 which was the
main entrance to the underground mine.
Under the proposed joint venture, a copy of which was
attached to the confirmation agreement, Dore would provide a
$6,000,000.00 credit line, and would ultimately be a half owner
of the mines.

Prior to actual vesting of title, Dore's

investment would be secured by a first trust deed on the mines.
The confirmation agreement further provided

that if Dore

elected to not enter into the joint venture, it would nonetheless provide United with a $500,000.00 line of credit at
certain specified terms, secured by the A-level and Phelan
dumps on the mine property.
2

An "adit" is an opening which leads into an underground
mine, as contrasted with a tunnel, which has opening on both
ends (i.e., goes all the way through a mountain) . A "crosscut"
is a horizontal internal opening from a shaft to an ore
deposit. A "drift" is a tunnel with no openings to the outside
air (e.g., from one internal shaft to another). Although these
are the technical definitions, the words are sometimes used
interchangeably. (R. 307-08.)
9

The confirmation agreement provided that October 15, 1981,
was the deadline for exercise of the option.

On October 14,

1981, Steven Friedrich, the president of LLC, Dore's parent
company, and LLC's general counsel, Thomas Slaughter, traveled
to Twin Falls, Idaho in preparation for exercising the option
and closing the agreement.

(Tr. 61, 63.)

In anticipation of

closing, Dore had caused 1.6 million dollars to be transferred
to a local bank.

(Tr. 63-64.) United had previously disclosed

the pendency of the Hoffman litigation, but Thomas Miller had
stated that Hoffman's claims concerned only a request for an
accounting and did not pose any problem to the proposed joint
venture.

(Tr. 119.)

At the meeting on October 15, 1981,

Dore's counsel telephoned the attorney for Hoffman in the
Hoffman litigation and was informed that Hoffman intended to
press a claim for ownership rights in the Vipont Mines.
130, 134.)

(Tr.

Based on that information, Dore determined to not

proceed with the joint venture at that time because of the lack
of marketable title.

(Tr. 137-38.)

To give United an opportunity to resolve the title problems, the option to enter into the joint venture agreement was
extended by mutual agreement of the parties from time to time,
but it ultimately expired on February 3, 1983.

(R. 1058.)

Prior to that date, United delivered to Dore a commitment for
title insurance issued by Hillam Abstracting and Insurance
Company of Brigham City, Utah, and underwritten by First
American Title Insurance Company.

iw

The commitment offered to

issue

a

title

insurance

policy

with

a

face

amount

of

$6,000,000.00, subject to the restrictions and exclusions
listed in the commitment, and insuring that Bannock Silver
Mining Company held title to the mines,
Tr. 165.)

(Exhibit 8, R. 1058,

Dore concluded that the title insurance did not

resolve the title problems (Tr. 192-94), and never exercised
the option to enter into the joint venture.
After the final expiration of the option to enter into
the

joint

$500,000.00
agreement.

venture, United

made

demand

line of credit described

on

Dore

for the

in the confirmation

Dore declined to grant the line of credit assert-

ing that the same title problems made United unable to provide
the required security for the line of credit. (Tr. 348.) Dore
then sought to recover possession of certain of the equipment
it had purchased for United's use in the confirmation project,
including a load-haul-dump ("LHD") machine purchased by Dore
at a cost of approximately $98,000.00. (Tr. 351.)

United

refused to relinquish possession of the equipment unless Dore
paid approximately $80,000.00 in claimed storage charges. (Tr.
350-51, Ex. 31.)

Dore thereafter commenced this litigation.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT

The summary judgment dismissing United's claims relating
to the $500,000.00 line of credit was compelled by the undisputed facts.

An implicit requirement of the confirmation

agreement was that United have the ability to convey market11

able title to the mines.
ability.

United clearly did not have that

Title to the mines was vested in Bannock Silver

Mining Company.

Although United claimed to own the stock of

Bannock, in actual fact the stock had been purchased by Hoffman
and contributed to Vipont Mines, Ltd.

Hoffman had a lien on

the stock and hence on the mine properties to secure his rights
under the Vipont limited partnership. Even if it is ultimately
determined in the Idaho litigation that Hoffman did not have
such a right, he claimed such a right at the times relevant to
this action. It is the fact the adverse claim is made, not its
ultimate validity, which renders title unmarketable.
The commitment for title insurance did not render the
title marketable.

Insurable title is not the equivalent of

marketable title.

Dore was not a lender whose interest could

be protected by title insurance, but had an option to acquire
a half ownership in the mines. In addition, the exclusions in
the title policy would have applied to render the policy
ineffective because Dore had actual knowledge of Hoffman's
claims.
United breached its agreement to perform the confirmation
project on a cost-only basis and overcharged Dore for the work
performed. The confirmation agreement provided that Dore would
pay United $43,000.00 for purchase of timber to be used in the
confirmation project.

The undisputed testimony established

that the timber was purchased but not used.

Instead, United

purchased additional timber and billed Dore for that additional
12

timber. Dore was entitled to recover for the additional timber
purchased.

The trial court's denial of Dore's claims was

contrary to the undisputed evidence.
United challenges the award of attorney fees to Dore.
The evidence supports the fee awarded, but further shows that
the fee was too low.

Counsel for Dore asserted that ap-

proximately 75% of the over $170,000.00 in fees was incurred
in defending United's claims related to the line of credit.
The trial court apparently ignored this testimony and arbitrarily awarded fees for only one-half of the time prior to
the ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment and
failed to award any fees for subsequent work defending the
summary judgment.

The reduction was arbitrary and not sup-

ported by the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HOLDING THAT UNITED SILVER DID NOT HAVE
MARKETABLE TITLE.
A.

Standard of Review.

The district court held on summary judgment that Dore had
no obligation to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to United.
The summary judgment should be reviewed by this court for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. The facts
and inferences therefrom are to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and the summary judgment should
13

be affirmed only if no genuine issues of material fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Pavincr, Inc. v. Blomquist,

773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
B.

United Was Required to Tender Marketable Title.

The district court dismissed United7s claim for damages
for Dore's failure to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit
because United failed to tender marketable title to the subject mining properties.

Title is critical to two facets of

the confirmation agreement, depending on whether or not Dore
exercised the option to enter into the joint venture with
United.

If Dore exercised the option to enter into the joint

venture, the proposed joint venture contemplated that Dore
would extend a $6,000,000.00 line of credit to United, secured
by a first trust deed on all of the mining properties.

After

the line of credit became fully advanced, Dore would become
entitled to actual fee title to a one-half interest in the
mining properties.
The second area in which title was critical was if Dore
elected to not enter the joint venture agreement. The confirmation agreement provided that Dore would then be obligated to
extend to United a $500,000.00 line of credit, secured by the
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A-level and Phelan dumps. United failed to tender marketable
title either to the mining properties or to the dumps.3
United represented in the proposed joint venture agreement that it could cause Dore to be deeded a "one-half fee
simple interest" in the mining properties, title to which was
in Bannock Silver Mining Company.

Even had United not ex-

pressly represented that it controlled title to the subject
mining claims, a requirement that it hold title on the date
Dore chose to exercise its option to enter the joint venture
agreement would have been implied in law. See Corporation Nine
v. Taylor. 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973).

The term

"title" must be construed to mean and refer to clear and
marketable title, free of all liens and encumbrances.

77 Am.

Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 123 (1975); Hall v. Fitzgerald,
671 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah 1983).

United's duty to tender mar-

ketable title was a condition precedent to any duty on the part
of Dore to extend a line of credit.

McFadden v. Wilder, 6

Ariz. App. 60, 429 P.2d 694, 697 (1967).4
3

It is not entirely clear from the agreements whether the
dumps are considered to be part of the mining properties. See
Footnote 6 of Dore,s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at R. 829-30, and
the cases cited thereat.
4

United cites to McFadden as support for the proposition
that "an %acceptable owner's title insurance policy' is
sufficient to satisfy any condition precedent which involves
the furnishing of xtitle'." (United's Brief at p. 15.) It
appears more likely from the opinion that the furnishing of
title insurance was required by the contract at issue in that
case. 429 P.2d 694. There is certainly nothing in the opinion
15

Marketable or merchantable title is that quality of title
which a reasonably prudent man familiar with the facts would
accept in the ordinary course of business.

It must be free

from liens and encumbrances, free from reasonable doubt as to
its validity, and free from the hazard of present or potential
litigation. Hedqecock v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. , 676 P.2d
1208, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Darby v. Keeran, 211 Kan.
133, 505 P.2d 710, 715 (1973).

An adverse claim to the prop-

erty may render the title unmarketable, even if the adverse
claim is not actively asserted.

Paramount Properties Co. v.

Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746,
749, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970); Michaelson v. Tieman, 36 Colo.
App. 435, 541 P.2d 91 (1975).
Marketable title is not the same as insurable title.
Title may still be considered unmarketable even though a title
company is willing to write a title insurance policy insuring
the validity of the title. Kipahulu Investment Co. v. Seltzer
Partnership, 4 Haw. App. 625, 675 P.2d 778

(1983), cert,

denied, 67 Haw. 635, 744 P.2d 781 (1984).
The burden of proving that title is marketable is upon
the party asserting the validity of the title, and that burden
in this action was therefore upon United.

Michaelson, supra,

541 P.2d at 92.

which would indicate that the Court of Appeals of Arizona made
a reasoned determination that insurablity is equivalent to
marketability.
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C.

The Hoffman Claims Clouded Title,

Applying the above rules to the facts in the instant
matter, it is clear that United did not possess, own, or
control and did not tender marketable title to the subject
mining claims to Dore at any relevant time. The cloud against
the title was not just a mere possibility of a claim of questionable merit, but was a claim actually asserted in a pending
action in which a business partner of United, Paul Hoffman,
asserted, and continued to assert through trial in the instant
case, a substantial interest in the subject mining claims and
the dumps and tailings located thereon.
Hoffman's claims arise from a Limited Partnership Agreement—Vipont Mines, Ltd. and other documents executed between
Hoffman and United.

The partnership agreement provided that

Hoffman was to make certain contributions to the partnership,
and that he would "be entitled to hold and claim a lien upon
the interest of the General Partner [United] and the Partnership in the Vipont Silver Mine property and upon any minerals
produced therefrom until the contributions have been fully
repaid."

(Limited Partnership Agreement (attached to United's

brief) 5 3.2(g).)

The parties devoted substantial effort

before the trial court to analyze the partnership agreements
to determine whether Hoffman's lien rights had matured.

A

thorough analysis of the effect of those documents appears in
Dore's memoranda filed with the trial court.
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(R. 794-834;

1004-15.)

A detailed analysis of those claims is not neces-

sary in this brief, however, because the Hoffman litigation
was the subject of an opinion issued by the Idaho Court of
Appeals subsequent to the trial in this matter.

Hoffman v.

United Silver Mines. Inc., 116 Idaho 240, 775 P.2d 132 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1989).

A copy of the opinion appears in Appendix "I"

of this brief.

Although the Court of Appeals of Idaho held

that the agreements were ambiguous in certain respects, 775
P.2d at 138, the court held that the agreements were clear in
providing that Hoffman's contributions "were characterized as
x

loans,' secured by a xlien' on the general partner's interest

and on the partnership itself."

775 P. 2d at 136.

See also

775 P.2d at 139, 140.
The ultimate resolution of the Hoffman litigation and the
concomitant determination of the "correct" interpretation to
be given to the agreements is not, however, relevant to the
instant action.

Title is not marketable if there is a threat

of litigation, regardless of whether the claim ultimately
proves groundless.
United asserts in its brief that the effect of the Hoffman
claims was nonetheless vitiated by the title insurance commitment and by a preliminary injunction entered in the Hoffman
litigation.

Neither rendered title marketable.

The preliminary injunction entered in the Hoffman litigation ordered Hoffman to release a lis pendens he had filed
against the mining claims. A copy of the release is attached
18

to United's brief.

United argues that if the court ordered

Hoffman to not claim a lien# it follows that his claims did
not cloud title.
United's argument fails for several reasons.
preliminary

First, the

injunction was just that, preliminary.5

The

underlying claims still existed. Second, on November 26, 1982,
which was subsequent to the preliminary injunction but prior
to the final expiration of Dore's option to enter the joint
venture agreement, Hoffman filed an Amended Complaint in the
Hoffman action, in which he asserted that Phase I of the
development contemplated by the partnership agreement had been
completed (i.e., $750,000.00 had been spent in developing the
mines), and that Hoffman was therefore the owner, and entitled
to be the owner of record, of a 25% interest in the limited
partnership and that he was entitled to certain specified
percentages of the income produced from the subject mining
Under Idaho law, the Order in Re Motions for Preliminary
Injunctions of Plaintiff and Defendant, entered in the Hoffman
action on June 22, 1982, only determined the following: (1)
United's counterclaim in that action (which prayed for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief) stated a cause of
action; i.e. , it was not subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to stat a claim, see White v. Coeur D'Alene Big Creek Mining Co. , 56 Idaho 282, 55 P.2d 720, 722
(193 6) (movant does not need to show that he would be entitled
to the relief prayed for on final hearing, but only that the
transaction is a proper subject of investigation by a court of
equity) ; (2) the assertion by Hoffman of an interest in the
subject mining claims pending the disposition of the Hoffman
action on its merits might result in irreparable injury to
United; and (3) Hoffman's assertion of an interest in the
subject mining claims during the pendency of the action would
tend to render any judgment upon the counterclaim ineffectual.
See Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e).
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claims and the dumps and tailings. (R. 515-26.)

It is there-

fore evident that Hoffman claimed an interest in Vipont Mines,
Ltd. , and in the subject mining claims and the dumps and
tailings and any income produced therefrom at all times from
October 15, 1981, through and including February 3, 1983.
Finally, as noted below at page 24 of this brief, prior
to the instant trial the court in the Hoffman litigation
entered a judgment holding that Hoffman was entitled to claim
a lien.
The Hoffman litigation and claims certainly at least
raised a suspicion concerning United's ability to cause Bannock
to convey clear title.

Title was not marketable at the times

critical to this action.
D.

The Commitment For Title Insurance Did Not Make The
Title Marketable.
At some point after the initial deadline for exer-

cise of the option to enter the joint venture agreement, but
prior to the last extension, United tendered to Dore a commitment for title insurance.

(Exhibit 8, Tr. 165.)

The exis-

tence of this commitment did not make title marketable for
several reasons.

First, "marketable title" and "insurable

title" are not synonymous terms.

Kipahulu Investment Co. v.

Seltzer Partnership, 675 P.2d 778, 781 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983);
Makofsky v. Cunningham. 576 F.2d 1223, 1235 (5th Cir. 1978).
Makofsky stated the rule as follows:
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[A] title insurance policy is
not equivalent to a merchantable
title in Louisiana; it is an
agreement by an insurer to
satisfy claims against the property. It is limited in coverage
to the amount stated on its
face. A buyer who erects improvements having a value in
excess of the face amount of the
policy will not be protected for
the excess.
In any event,
having the right to make claims
is not the eguivalent of assurance that no claims need be
made.
576 F.2d at 1235 (emphasis added).
Dore contracted for the right to enter the proposed joint
venture whereby Dore could obtain fee title to a half interest
in the mines.

It appears obvious that Dore hoped to receive

more than just return of the $6,000,000.00 plus interest.
United's failure to tender marketable title made this option
to enter the joint venture agreement and obtain fee title
worthless.

Where United thus breached its duty to tender

marketable title, Dore was excused from any duty it may have
had to extend the $500,000.00 line of credit.

Converse v.

Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1981); Windward Partners v. Lopes,
3 Haw. App. 30, 640 P.2d 872 (1982); Parsons Supply, Inc. v.
Smith, 22 Wash. App. 520, 591 P.2d 821 (1979); Rogers v.
Relyea, 184 Mont. 1, 601 P.2d 37 (1979).
A second reason why the title insurance did not cure the
title defects is that the commitment proposed only to insure
that Bannock Silver Mining Company had title. It said nothing
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about the right or ability of United to compel Bannock to
convey title to Dore. Although United presented self-serving
testimony that it had full authority to cause Bannock to
convey title, that testimony was disputed for reasons shown
below. Again, it is only the existence of the dispute that is
relevant, not the correctness of the claim.
Prior to the formation of the Vipont limited partnership
between United and Hoffman, United owned only approximately
16% of the Bannock stock.

The remaining 84% of the outstand-

ing stock was purchased by Hoffman as part of his contribution
to the partnership.

(R. 443, f 24.)

Paragraph 6 of Plain-

tiff's Second Request for Production of Documents to Defendant

requested

United

to produce

"[a]11"

stock

transfer

records of Bannock, and all documents reflecting or showing
the consideration paid or received for shares of Bannock's
capital stock."

In response thereto, United produced a stock

certificate, issued April 7, 1977, in the name of Paul Hoffman
for 2,150,000 shares (R. 648-49, 940-41.), and produced various other documents which were part of the same transaction.
There were no documents which indicated that the 2,150,000
shares had ever been transferred at any time subsequent to
April 7, 1977, and thus no proof the shares had been validly
transferred to United.
In answers to interrogatories, United stated that there
were 2,560,000 shares of Bannock stock outstanding.
5 11.)

(R. 440

United further asserted that it was the owner of all
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Bannock stock.

(R. 440-41, ff 14-15.)

The basis for this

assertion is set forth in the interrogatory answers as follows:
INTERROGATORY
NO.
24:
State whether Paul Hoffman ever
transferred to Vipont Mines,
Ltd., the 2,150,000 shares of
Bannock
stock described
in
Section 3.2(a) of the Vipont
Mines, Ltd., Partnership Agreement, and state the date of the
transfer and the terms of each
document evidencing such transfer.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.
24: Hoffman, who acquired the
shares of stock through the auspices of Miller and who held
them
in trust
for United
Silver's benefit, transferred
the shares to Vipont on April
30, 1977.
The transfer was
consistent with the Limited
Partnership Agreement of April
30, 1977. When Hoffman failed
to honor his Subscription Agreement which would have entitled
him to acquire an interest in
Vipont, the shares vested in
United.
(R. 443.)
Even if Hoffman was deemed to have transferred

the

Bannock stock to the Vipont partnership, he still claimed a
lien on the assets of the partnership, including the mine.
United acknowledged in its trial brief that the trial court in
the Hoffman litigation ultimately concluded that "Hoffman is
entitled to a lien on the interest of the general partner
[United] anrf the partnership in the Vipont Silver Mine proper23

ty, until those loans (the $436,000.00 fronted by Hoffman)
have been repaid."

(R. 1197.)

The Idaho Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court7s conclusion that Hoffman's investment was secured by a lien on the general partner's interest
and on the partnership itself. Hoffmanr 775 P.2d at 139, 140.
Even

assuming, therefore, that the title

commitment

assured the lack of any clouds against the title to the mines,
the title commitment was silent on the issue of United's right
or ability to convey that title to Dore.

There existed and

still exists a dispute as to whether United has that right.
Title was clearly not marketable.
A

final

reason

why

the

title

commitment

was

not

equivalent to marketable title is that the terms of the policy
itself would appear to except coverage under the circumstances
of this case.

Paragraph 2 of Schedule B of the commitment

states that the insurance policy to be issued will contain an
exception for "[a]ny facts, rights, interests, or claims which
are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of
persons in possession thereof."

(Exhibit 8.)

Dore had made

inquiry of the party in possession of the land and had learned
of Hoffman's claim.

There would have been at least an argu-

ment (again, certainty is not required) that the title company
would have contested coverage had Dore made a claim on the
policy.
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E.

United Did Not Have Clear And Marketable Title To
The Dumps At Any Time Material Herein.

Point I above establishes that Dore had attempted to
exercise the option to enter the joint venture agreement, but
United breached its covenant to have good and marketable title
to the subject mining claims. Dore was therefore excused from
any further obligations under the confirmation agreement, including any obligation it may otherwise have had to extend a
$500,000.00 line of credit to United.
As is established below, however, even if Dore had voluntarily elected, for reasons totally unrelated to any fault or
breach on the part of United, to not exercise its option to
enter into the joint venture agreement, Dore would still have
had no obligation to extend the $500,000.00 line of credit to
United.
United's claim for a line of credit is based upon paragraph 5(c) of the confirmation agreement.

That paragraph

provides that the line of credit was to be established, if at
all, only "upon presentation to Dore of title to [the A-level
and Phelan] dumps as collateral . . . ." The dumps consist of
refuse piles from earlier mining operations which with modern
mineral recovery methods may now be economically valuable.
The cases cited at pages 15 to 17 of this brief establish that
the term "title" must be construed to mean and refer to clear
and marketable title, free of all liens and encumbrances, free
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from reasonable doubt as to its validity, and free from the
hazard of present or potential litigation.
In addition to the circumstances described in the previous sections of this Point I regarding title to the subject
mining claims, all of which applies with equal force to the
dumps, there were additional claims against the dumps only.
Paragraph 4.1 of the Hoffman partnership agreement stated that
the parties anticipated processing the tailings and dumps, and
provided that all net revenues realized from the processing of
the tailings and dumps were to be distributed 20% to United
and the first $350,000.00 of the remaining 80% to be retained
by the partnership to assist in financing the Phase I development, with any amounts over $350,000.00 to be applied to
paying off the contributions to the partnership made by
Hoffman.
It is clear that at all material times herein Hoffman
claimed an interest in Vipont Mines, Ltd., and in and to any
income which was produced from the dumps or tailings by any
party.

Hoffman's claims were the subject of actual pending

litigation at all material times hereto.

The validity of

those claims had not, at least through the time of trial, been
finally determined by any court of competent jurisdiction.
Title to the dumps and tailings was, therefore, unmarketable
at all materials times hereto and Dore had no obligation to
extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to United.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT UNITED WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY PEES FOR
SUCCESSFULLY RESISTING DORE'S CLAIM FOR RESCISSION.
United argues on pages 22-25 of its brief that it is
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for successfully defending Dore's claim for rescission of the confirmation agreement.
The question of the legal effect to be given to the unambiguous terms of the contract is a question of law to be
reviewed by this court for correctness.

50 West Broadway

Associates v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah
1989) .
In support of its argument that a claim for rescission is
an action on a contract, United cites three cases: Ayotte v.
Redmon, 110 Idaho 726, 718 P.2d

1164

(1986); Hastings v.

Matlock, 171 Cal. App. 3d 826, 217 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1985);
Preston v. McDonnell. 203 Mont. 64, 659 P.2d 276

(1983).

However persuasive these cases may be in their own jurisdictions, they do not accurately represent the law of Utah.

In

BLT Investment Co. v. Snow. 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978), the
Utah Supreme Court squarely held that an action for rescission
is not an action on a contract, and that attorney fees may not
be awarded based on the contract. Accord, Quealy v. Anderson.
714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986).
The district court properly determined that Dore's claim
for rescission was not a claim "to enforce the provisions" of
27

the contract, and that United was not entitled to recover its
attorney fees incurred in resisting the claim.
POINT III
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARDED TO DORE ON ITS SUCCESSFUL
DEFENSE OF UNITED'S CLAIM FOR A LINE OF CREDIT
WAS NOT UNREASONABLY HIGH.
On pages 25 and 26 of its brief, United challenges the
attorney fee awarded to Dore for its successful defense of
United's contract-based damage claim for Dore's refusal to
grant a line of credit. "The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear
abuse of discretion."

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d

985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
United offers no evidence in support of its challenge to
the award of attorney fees, but only offers the conclusion
that the award "would certainly seem to be totally disproportionate to the effort involved."

(United's brief at 25.)

United's challenge to the attorney fee must be denied because
United has not marshalled the evidence which supports the fee,
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), and
there is no such evidence.

Absent some admissible evidence,

there is no basis on which this court could determine that the
fee is disproportionate to the effort involved.

An attorney

fee award is not improper merely because it greatly exceeds
the fees incurred by the opposing party, Dixie State Bank v.
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Bracken, 764 P.2d at 987, nor because the fee is high compared
with the amount recovered.

Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,

625 (Utah 1985).
Dore argues in the following point that the fee awarded
was actually far less than a reasonable fee, and that this
case should be remanded for an award of an additional attorney
fee.

There clearly is no evidence presented to this court

which would justify a determination that the fee was excessive.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OP DORE'S ATTORNEY PEE
CLAIM WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Dore incurred attorney fees of over $170,000.00 (R. 1437,
1499.), and Dore,s counsel represented to the trial court that
at least 75 to 80% of that was incurred in defending United's
claim for damages related to the denial of the $500,000.00
line of credit.

(Tr. Feb. 22, 1989, at pp 52, 55, 70.)

trial court awarded a fee of only $29,853.00.

The

Dore asserts

that the reduction in the fee was not supported by the evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. The calculation
of the award is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear
abuse of discretion.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d

985 (Utah 1988).
The only evidence concerning attorney fees was that contained in the affidavits of counsel submitted to the trial
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court.

The affidavits submitted by Dore contained a detailed

day-by-day listing of the services performed, together with
testimony of the necessity of the work performed and the
reasonableness of the fee charged.

At oral argument on the

attorney fee issue, the trial court inquired of Dore's counsel
how much of the fees were related to the defense of United7s
claim for damages arising from denial of the $500,000.00 line
of credit. Dore's counsel unequivocally replied that at least
7 0 to 80% of the fees were incurred in that portion of the
case.

Dore's counsel further explained that the fees on that

issue included responding to United's Motion

for Summary

Judgment and supporting Dore's Motion for Summary Judgment,
responding to United's challenge to the form of summary judgment

and

the

Order

Determining

Uncontroverted

Facts and

Conclusions of Law, and in responding to United's attempt on
the eve of trial, before a new district judge, to seek reconsideration and vacation of the prior grant of summary judgment. (Tr. Feb. 22, 1989, at pp. 48-52.)
In determining the fee award, the trial court noted that
there was "no real contest between the parties relative to the
reasonableness of the hourly fees."

(R. 1559.)

The court

then estimated an appropriate fee by making several assumptions and observations:

(1) the summary judgment motions

filed by both parties were, for the most part, directed at
defending against United's counterclaim;

(2) although some

efforts were expended after the grant of summary judgment in
3<X

resisting United's renewed efforts to challenge the summary
judgment, most of the post-summary judgment time was expended
in trial preparation; (3) approximately 500 hours of attorney
time was spent between February, 1985, when defendant filed
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and August, 1986,
when the hearing on summary judgment was held; and (4) the
"court cannot determine the exact number of hours spent exclusively [in defense of the counterclaim], but it would be
safe to find that at least one-half thereof applied."

(R.

1559.)
The trial court then proceeded to award Dore one-half of
the attorney fees incurred from February, 1985 through August,
1986.

It follows that the trial court awarded no fees what-

soever for the acknowledged efforts in defending United's
renewed efforts just before trial to challenge the summary
judgment.
Dore appreciates that it would have required some effort
on the part of the trial court to make a more precise determination of the time spent in defense of the counterclaim.6
That the job was difficult is not, however, an excuse for

Had Dore known in advance of the ruling that the trial
court would segregate the various aspects of the case in the
manner which it did, Dore could have performed a detailed and
accurate allocation of the fees for the trial court. Dore did
not have that opportunity because it had no advance notice that
the trial court would segregate the categories of fees as it
did.
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failing to perform the task, nor does it justify engaging in
the gross generalizations made by the trial court.
The magnitude of the trial court's error may be appreciated by considering the time isolated by the trial court,
that between February, 1985 and August, 1986. The trial court
stated that it could not determine the exact number of hours
spent in defending the counterclaim, but that it was at least
half of the time. The actual percentage was in excess of 78%.
Attached to this brief as Appendix "J" is a copy of the pages
of Dore's attorney fee affidavit relating to the February,
1985 to August, 1986 time. The hours which were clearly spent
in defense of the counterclaim have been circled.

All un-

related time is excluded, as well as a substantial portion of
time which arguably was spent in defense of the counterclaim.
For example, excluded is all time spent in responding to
United's discovery and in preparing discovery to United, even
though a large part of the discovery directly addressed the
counterclaim issues.

(R. 54-327, 436-612, 614-783.)

Also

excluded is time spent prior to February 1985 in responding to
United's discovery addressed to the counterclaim,

(R. 279-

3 03) , as well as the time spent responding to the motions on
the eve of trial.

The total of the hours from February 1985

to August 1986 appear on the chart following the affidavit
pages in Appendix MJ."

This simple computation shows that at

least 78% of the time in this period was spent in defending
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the counterclaim; if the related discovery were included, the
percentage would probably be closer to 95%.
The trial court7s arbitrary award of only one-half of the
fees during the critical time period is not supported by the
evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. In addition,
the trial court did not even purport to make an award of fees
for the efforts on the eve of trial, although the court acknowledged that the efforts were performed and that they
related to the defense of the counterclaim.

This case should

be remanded to the trial court with instructions to hold an
evidentiary hearing and to make an appropriate award of attorney fees based on the evidence.
This court has previously held that "a trial court abuses
its discretion in awarding less than the amount of the attorney fees requested when there is adequate and uncontroverted
evidence in the record to support those fees unless the court
offers

an

explanation

for

the

reduction

considering

the

factors previously discussed." Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v.
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

The court must make findings to

support the award, and the award may be reversed if the findings do not adequately explain the basis for the award.
The instant case fits squarely within this rule.

Id.
Dore

offered adequate and uncontroverted evidence of its attorney
fees.

The trial court did not purport to reduce the fees

based on any feeling that the fees were unreasonable, but only
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to limit the fees to those incurred in defending the counterclaim.

The trial court made no specific findings, but only

broad generalizations.

The award is plainly contrary to the

uncontroverted evidence.

The case should be remanded with

instructions to the trial court to make specific findings and
increase the fee to that supported by the evidence.
POINT V
UNITED WAS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR SUMS
PAID FOR PURCHASE OF TIMBER.
United was required to perform the work under the confirmation agreement on a cost-only basis. Dore promptly paid the
bills submitted by United, but subsequently asserted, after a
more detailed review, that many of the items were not justified or properly documented.

Dore was entitled to recover for

those payments upon proof that the charge was clearly inappropriate.

E.g. , Speckert v. Bunker Hill Arizona Mining

Co. , 6 Wash. 2d 39, 106 P.2d 602, 603 (1940).

The trial

court's factual determination on this issue will be reversed
only

if clearly

erroneous, i.e., the finding

is without

adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view
of the law.

Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P. 2d 1046, 1048 (Utah

Ct. App. 1990).
are

stipulated,

Where the underlying facts are undisputed or
this

court will

review

for correctness.

Richfield v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The trial court correctly observed that $43,000.00 was
expended by United for timber "which never left the lumber
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yard and was not used on the project."

(R. 1426-27.)

The

trial court concluded that plaintiff was possibly at fault in
failing to ensure that the timber was used on the project, and
that the timber was in any event now worthless.

The trial

court misperceived the critical issue, which is that United
purchased and charged Dore for other timber which was used on
the project, and which would not have been necessary had the
$43,000.00 in timber been used.
The confirmation agreement included a provision requiring
Dore to "pay to United $43,000.00 as a non-refundable payment
to be used to purchase timber for the A-level rehabilitation
and for the Miller cross cut."

(Exhibit 2, f 4(a).)

The

undisputed evidence showed that United purchased other timber
for use on the A-level rehabilitation.

(Tr. 276.)

Although

the $43,000.00 was by contract non-refundable, it does not
follow that it was a gift.

The timber purchased with the

$43,000.00 was specifically earmarked "for use on the A-level
rehabilitation and the Miller cross cut."

United admittedly

did not use the timber on the A-level rehabilitation, and
instead purchased other timber and charged Dore for it.

It

allowed the $43,000.00 worth of timber to go to waste. United
should accordingly reimburse Dore for the timber purchased,
and this case should be remanded with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Dore for $43,000.00.
POINT VI
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THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARD IN
RULING ON DORE'S PRAYER FOR RESCISSION.
Dore asserted that it was entitled to rescind the confirmation agreement and recover the payments it had made pursuant
to the agreementf because of United's breach of its obligation
to provide marketable title. Dore presented testimony that it
would not have entered into the agreement had it been aware of
the scope of the Hoffman claims.

(Tr. 151.)

The breach was

of such a magnitude that it defeated the very purpose of the
contract, entitling Dore to rescind the contract. Polyqlycoat
Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979); Berqstrom v.
Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1225 (Utah 1984).

The trial court

concluded, however, that Dore was not entitled to seek rescission because it went forward with the confirmation project
after learning of the Hoffman claim.
Initially, the trial court does not specify when it believed that Dore knew or could have discovered of the nature
of Hoffman's claims.

Dore presented evidence that it did not

know the extent of the claims until October 15, 1981, after
the confirmation project was well underway.

United had pre-

viously provided assurances that the Hoffman claims were of no
moment and continues to argue that position.
Even assuming, however, that Dore had knowledge of the
Hoffman claims in time to have ceased work on the confirmation
project, it does not follow that rescission was not available.
In Breur-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App.
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1990), the court addressed a very similar situation where a
party involved in a contract learned of an encumbrance which
clouded title and destroyed the purpose of the contract,
unless the encumbrance were to be removed.

The other party

promised to cure the defect or to make other arrangements to
compensate for it, and attempted to do so for a period of over
five years. When the efforts proved unsuccessful, the plaintiff sought to rescind the contract based on the defendant7s
anticipatory breach.

The defendants contested the rescission

claim, arguing that it had been waived by the continued performance after knowledge of the grounds for rescission.
court held as follows:
An original feature of the
English doctrine of anticipatory
breach was that a party continuing performance in the face of
an
anticipatory
repudiation
thereby waives the repudiation
and can only sue on a subsequent
breach, if any, occurring at the
time when performance is due.
[Citation]
The modern rule,
however, "is that an innocent
party, confronted with an anticipatory repudiation, may continue to treat the contract as
operable and urge performance by
the repudiating party without
waiving any right to sue for
that repudiation." [Citations.]
The basis for the modern
rule, as the Combes point out in
their reply brief, is to give
the breaching party the opportunity to cure the breach before
the time for performance is due.
A party that has received a
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The

definite repudiation from the
breaching party to the contract
should not be penalized for its
efforts to encourage the breaching party to perform its end of
the bargain. [Citation.] The
repudiating party has a power of
retraction as long as there has
been no substantial change of
position by the injured party
and the non-breaching party,s
continuing to urge performance
may be properly held to keep
this power of retraction alive.
[Citation.]
799 P.2d at 725-26 (citations omitted).
The instant case is strikingly similar to the facts of
Breur-Harrison.

The evidence would support a conclusion that

Dore did not discover the true nature of Hoffman's claims
until it was already well into the confirmation project.

By

mutual agreement, the parties extended the time within which
United was required to tender marketable title, in order to
give United an opportunity to work out the title problems.
Dore should not be penalized for this effort at conciliation.
The trial court made its ruling based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law.

Although its ruling is largely

discretionary, where it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, Dore is entitled to a reversal to have the
trial court reconsider its determination in light of the
Breur-Harrison standard.

Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857,

859 (Utah 1979); Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); State ex rel R. R. v. C. R. . 797 P.2d 459 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).

POINT VII
UNITED SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
The trial court properly held that Dore was entitled to
recover

its attorney

counterclaim.

fees incurred

in defending United's

Dore has incurred additional fees on appeal in

defense of the counterclaim.

This case should be remanded

with instructions to award Dore a reasonable attorney fee for
its defense

of

the

counterclaim

on

appeal.

Management

Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 40809 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment dismissing United7s counterclaim for
damages for denial of the $500,000.00 line of credit should be
affirmed.

A condition precedent to the obligation to extend

the line of credit was United7s tender of marketable title to
the mines.

United did not tender marketable title because

there existed a present and existing adverse claim, or at the
minimum, a real threat of an adverse claim.
The denial of attorney fees to United on its defense of
Dore's claim for rescission should be affirmed.

Utah law

clearly establishes that a claim for rescission does not arise
out of a contract.
The attorney fee award to Dore for its successful defense
of United's counterclaim should be reversed and remanded with
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instructions to increase the award in accordance with the
evidence.

Alternatively, the award should be affirmed, be-

cause the evidence supported at least the amount of the award
given.
The case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to award to Dore $43,000.00 for sums paid during
the confirmation project for the purchase of timber. Although
the $4 3,000.00 paid to United was labeled non-refundable, the
timber so purchased was to have been used in the confirmation
project, and Dore should not have been charged for the purchase of additional timber.
Finally, Dore's claim for rescission should be remanded
to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the BreurHarrison standard.
Dore is further entitled to an award of cittorney fees for
its continued defense of United7s counterclaim on this appeal.
DATED this

/7 ^

day of December, 1990.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to each of the following, postage prepaid, this

day of December, 1990.

Lloyd J. Webb, Esq.
Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Webb
155 Second Avenue North
P. 0. Box 1768
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768
Roger F. Baron, Esq.
Bunderson and Baron
45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302
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Memorandum D e c i s i o n
(on motions f o r p a r t i a l suinmary judgmenl

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DORE METALS AND MINING
CORPORATION, a Corporation,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.,
a Corporation,

18093

Defendant.

Each party hereto has moved for summary judgment and supported
the same by affidavits, documents, answers to interrogatories and
memoranda.
The central issue involves title to mining properties including
patented claims and dumps.

Two contracts are involved, the confirma-

tion agreement, to give Dore the right to prove ore reserves on
Unitedfs mining property, hopefully - 1,000,00f ounces of recoverable
silver, with

100,000 ounces expected in the dumps.

The second contract

was a joint venture agreement which would, if exercised, result in
each party owing fifty (50%) percent of the mining properties.

The

joint venture agreement was not executed and execution thereof depended
on the confirmation agreement.
Both parties in their briefs seem to recognize that United would
have to produce marketable title to the mining properties.

United

claims the title insurance commitment, the preliminary injunction of

Al*

the Idaho District Court and the release of lis pendens ordered by
M I C P O F I L N. E D

£-?

a 1986

^051

-2the Idaho Court satisfied the requirements of marketability and therefore the failure of Dore to execute and perform the joint venture
agreement obligated Dore to provide a $500,000.00 line of credit to
United according to the terms of the confirmation agreement.
Dore argues, there is a pending law suit before the Idaho Court
by Paul Hoffman under his agreements with United, asserting a twentyfive (25%) percent present interest in and an option to obtain fifty
(50%) percent interest in the same mining properties involved in the
instant law suit.

Dore further argues the preliminary injunction by the

Idaho Court is in effect only pending disposition of the law suit on
its merits, and therefore United is unable and has failed to tender
marketable title thus freeing Dore from obligation to provide the
$500,000.00 line of credit, and also to entitle Dore to recision of
the confirmation contract.
The court recognizes that there is some correspondence between
United and one Friedrich, the chairman and president of LLC Corporation,
the parent company of Dore and some of the answers in Friedrichfs
deposition, which indicate LLC would require a title insurance policy
thus leading United to believe the title insurance commitment satisfied
the title requirements.

However, neither the correspondence nor the

deposition are in any way conclusive on the matter and Friedrich points
out in his deposition that what was thought to be an action for an
accounting by Hoffman was later learned to be a claim for twenty-five
(25%) to fifty (50%) percent of the properties themselves.

Further,

1052

-3Friedrich was discharged by LLC prior to the determination of Dore
through LLC not to execute the joint venture agreement.
Both parties cite Kipahulu Investment Company vs. Seltzer 675 P
2nd 778 (Hawaii) which recognizes that title insurance is not necessarily
equivalent to marketability.

United argues that the facts therein

involving potential subdivision property with probable improvements
exceeding the value of the insurance policy made the case inapplicable
upon its facts to the present case.

However, this court sees considerable

similarity in continuing expenditures and improvements and anticipated
ore production of mining property to the anticipated improvements and
profits from a subdivision venture.

Title insurance covering the

initial outlay may not be adequate to cover the ultimate expenditures
in the development of a mine.
The court further finds and concludes the parties contemplated
marketable title, free and clear of liens or encumbrances and reasonable
certainty of freedom from law suits.

Here a lawsuit presently exists

under documents which may entitle the litigant to a lien on the property
and to eighty (80%) percent of the net proceeds from the processing of
the dumps and tailings.

Accordingly defendant's motion for summary

judgment compelling plaintiff to furnish $500,000.00 line of credit to
defendant should be denied.

That part of plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment adjudicating no obligation on plaintiff to provide such
$500,000.00 line of credit should be granted.
The nature of the confirmation contract and the considerable
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-4performance thereunder, particularly noting the knowledge of Dore before
entering into the transaction that

some claim was being asserted by

Hoffman, lead the court to the conclusion that recision of the confirmation contract as contained in the other part of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment would not be justified and that part of plaintifffs
motion for summary judgment should also be denied*
Plaintiff to prepare and submit the appropriate findings and order.
Dated this _J*^

day of April, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

•OMER^J. CALL-DISTRICT JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this J^_ll_day
of April, 1986, to

Ray G. Martineau, Esq., 1800 Beneficial Life Tower,

36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorney for Plaintiff,
and to Lloyd J. Webb, Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine, 155 Second
Avenue North, Box 1768, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303, Attorney for defendant.
Jay R. Hirschi
Box Elder County Clerk

By

WYLtLKt' ^ • / T ^ ^ ^ r A ^ *
fT Deputy
Q
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Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and
Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment

r

RAY G. MARTINEAU
LESLIE W. SLAUGH
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C,
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
THOMAS H. CHURCH
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW
1354 Albion Avenue
P. 0. Box 1286
Burley, Idaho 83318
Telephone: (208) 678-9088
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DORE METALS AND MINING
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

]I
\)
)
])

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]

UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant.

]
]
)
]

Civil No. 18093

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("Defendant's Motion") filed herein dated February 14, 1985,
and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
("Plaintiff's Motion") filed herein dated July 26, 1985, came
on regularly before the above-entitled Court for hearing on
March 12, 1986, the plaintiff appearing by and through its
/ & & - .
ViCROFILMED

6"<?

20

^ ^ W 3

attorneys, Ray G. Martineau, Leslie W. Slaugh, and Thomas H.
Church, and the defendant appearing by and through its attorney, Lloyd J. Webb, and by and through its president, Thomas F.
Miller, and the Court having carefully reviewed and considered
the memoranda, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, the entire
record on file herein, and the Court having previously issued
its Memorandum Decision and entered its Order Determining
Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law herein and the
Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed herein
dated February 14, 1985 may be and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment filed herein dated July 25, 1985 which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff had no obligation to provide a
$500,000.00 line of credit to defendant may be and the same is
hereby granted.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that Count I of defendant's Counterclaim filed herein dated
April 11, 1985, may be and the same is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

-2-
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that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff is entitled
to a decree rescinding the Vipont Confirmation Project
Agreement be and the same %s hereby denied.
DATED this

rfjP

"day of May, 1986.
BY/£flE /COURT

District ,<j£rage

Certificate of Service
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of
Partial Summary Judgment and Order on Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment to the following on this

7

day of May,

1986:
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq.
Webb, Burton, Carlson & Pedersen
155 2nd Avenue North
P.O. Box 1768
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768
^•>?7«

Order Determining Uncontroverted Facts
and Conclusions of Law

RAY G. MARTINEAU
LESLIE W. SLAUGH
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C.
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
THOMAS H. CHURCH
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW
1354 Albion Avenue
P. 0. Box 1286
Burley, Idaho 83318
Telephone: (208) 678-9088
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER DETERMINING
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DORE METALS AND MINING
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.,
a corporation,

Civil No. 18093
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed
herein dated February 14, 1985, and Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment filed herein dated July 26, 1985, came
on regularly before the above-entitled Court for hearing on
March 12, 1986, the plaintiff appearing by and through its
attorneys, Ray G. Martineau, Leslie W. Slaugh, and Thomas H.

¥1
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'?;_ Roll No. P>
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Church, and the defendant appearing by and through its attorney, Lloyd J. Webb, and by and through its president, Thomas F.
Miller, and the Court having carefully reviewed and considered
the memoranda, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, the entire
record on file herein, and the arguments and statements of
counsel, and the Court having previously issued its Memorandum
Decision herein indicating that Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment should be denied, that the portion of
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which seeks an
adjudication that plaintiff had no obligation to provide a
$500,000.00 line of credit to defendant should be granted, and
that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff is entitled
to a decree rescinding the Vipont Confirmation Project should
be denied, and it therefore appearing that judgment has not
been rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked
for by the parties and that a trial is necessary for the proper
disposition of all remaining issues, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, now
finds, makes and enters the following order:
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. 56(d), that the following relevant facts appear
to be without substantial controversy:
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1.

On or about May 28, 1981 , the parties hereto

entered into a certain written agreement entitled Vipont
Confirmation Project Agreement ("Confirmation Agreement"), to
which was attached and made a part thereof by reference a
form of document entitled "Vipont Joint Venture Agreement"
("Joint Venture Agreement").
2.

The Joint Venture Agreement contemplated the

possible investment and expenditure by plaintiff of very
substantial sums of money (potentially a sum well in excess of
$6,000,000,00) in connection with the development, exploitation
and operation of the mining properties and related interests
("Mining Properties") which were the subject of the
Confirmation Agreement and the Joint Venture Agreement.
3.

The Confirmation Agreement provides in Paragraph

5 as follows:
In the event that Dore does not exercise the
option to enter into the joint venture
according to the terms of agreement thereof,
on or before October 15, 1981:

(c) Dore must grant United a $500,000 line
of credit for five (5) years secured by the
A-level and Phelan dumps if the sampling and
measurement activity on those dumps confirms
at least 100,000 ounces of silver. Said
confirmation activity must be completed
within four (4) weeks of the date of this
agreement and the line of credit established
upon presentation to Dore of title to said
dumps as collateral and the consultants
report confirming 100,000 ounces of silver.
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4.

The sampling and measurement activity as to the A-

level and Phelan dumps called for by the Confirmation Agreement
was ultimately completed and confirmed the presence at least
100,000 ounces of silver.
5.

The option granted to plaintiff under the

Confirmation Agreement to enter into the Joint Venture
Agreement was extended from time to time by mutual agreement of
the parties and ultimately expired on February 3, 1983.
6.

Prior to February 3, 1983, defendant delivered to

plaintiff a cetrain Commitment for Title Insurance isued by
Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Company of Brigham City, Utah
in the proposed insurance amount of $6,000,000.00, covering the
title to the mining claims compromising a portion of the Mining
Properties, subject to those certain restrictions and exclusions listed therein.
7.

Defendant made demand on plaintiff for plaintiff

to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to defendant but plaintiff has failed and refused to extend any credit to defendant.
8.

Record title to the Mining Properties was at all

material times herein vested in Bannock Silver Mining Company
subject to certain easements, restrictions, and encumbrances of
record, and at no material time herein was any portion of the
record title to the Mining Properties vested in defendant.
9.

Plaintiff had actual knowledge prior to October
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15, 1981, of the pendancy of that certain civil action entitled
Paul Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc., Civil No.
13069-12-80, filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court of
Cassia County, State of Idaho ("Hoffman Action").
10.

Documents filed in the Hoffman Action reveal

that on or about April 30, 1977, defendant and Paul Hoffman
("Hoffman") executed a certain Limited Partnership AgreementVipont Mines Ltd. and a Financing Agreement ("Partnership
Agreements").
11.

Hoffman has asserted in the Hoffman Action that he

contributed some substantial sums of money to the limited partnership which is evidenced by the Partnership Agreements and
that he is entitled pursuant to the terms of the Partnership
Agreements to a 25% interest in and the right to acquire a 50%
interest in said limited partnership.
12.

Hoffman has further asserted in the Hoffman

Action, and the Partnership Agreements support, if not compel,
an adjudication that Hoffman has a valid lien upon the Mining
Properties and a claim to 80% of the net proceeds realized from
the processing of the dumps and tailings which compromise a
portion of the Mining Properties, to repay the contributions
made by Hoffman to said limited partnership.
14.

The Hoffman Action has at all material times

herein been, remained and still is pending and unresolved.

-5-

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the
Court hereby makes and enters the following conclusions of law:
1.

Defendant was required to tender marketable title

to the Mining Properties to plaintiff as a condition precedent
to any obligation on the part of plaintiff to extend any line
of credit to defendant.
2.

Marketable title under the circumstances of this

case required that the title to the Mining Properties be free
and clear of all liens or encumbrances and free from any
threatened or pending litigation that might adversely affect
plaintiff's interest in the Mining Properties,
3.

Title insurance coverage covering the potential

initial outlay by plaintiff might not afford plaintiff adequate
protection with respect to the ultimate expenditures and/or
investment which plaintiff might make in connection with its
potential ownership interest in the Mining Properties.
4.

A commitment for title insurance is not equivalent

to marketable title under the circumstances of this case, the
Court being persuaded in this regard by the holding and
rationale of Kipahulu Investment Co. v. Seltzer Partnership, 675
P.2d 778 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983).
5.

The pendency of the Hoffman Action and the claims

asserted by Hoffman in connection therewith rendered the title

to the Mining Properties unmarketable insofar as plaintiff is
concerned.
6.

Plaintiff has at no time had any obligation to

extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to defendant for the reason
that defendant failed to provide or tender to plaintiff good
and marketable title to the Mining Properties, which tender was
a condition precedent to any obligation on the part of plaintiff
to extend any line of credit to defendant.
7.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

filed herein dated February 14, 1985, should be denied.
8.

That portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment filed herein dated July 25, 1985, which seeks
an adjudication that plaintiff had no obligation to provide a
$500,000.00 line of credit to defendant should be granted.
9.

Count I of United's Counterclaim filed herein

dated April 11, 1985, should be dismissed with prejudice.
10.

There exists a agenuine issue of material fact as

to the nature and extent of plaintiff's knowledge and notice of
Hoffman's claim which might preclude plaintiff from rescinding
the Confirmation Agreement after there was considerable performance thereunder by the parties hereto.
11.

That portion of Plaintiff Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff is
entitled to a decree rescinding the Confirmation Agreement

-7-

should be denied,
DATED

//

this SLO

day of May, 1986,
BY^XHE COURT:

-OMER J. CA

Certificate of Service
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of Order
Specifying Facts that Appear Without Substantial Controversy to
the following on this

*7

day of May, 1986:

Lloyd J. Webb, Esq.
Webb, Burton, Carlson & Pedersen
155 2nd Avenue North
P. 0. Box 1768
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768
^ .
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(on matters litigated at trial)

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
STATE OF UTAH

DORE METALS AND MINING CORP., ]
Plaintiffs,
;
|
vs.
;|
UNITED SILVER MINES INC.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILE NO. 830018093

]
]

In this matter the Plaintiff filed suit seeking relief
essentially by way of recission of a contract and restitution
of certain property and expenses.

The Defendant

counter-claimed, alleging that the Plaintiff was obligated to
provide a line of credit and or payment of certain storage
fees.
The Suit arose from an agreement executed by and
between the parties May 28, 1981, called "Vipont Confirmation
Agreement" to which was attached and made a part by reference,
a document entitled Vipont Joint Venture Agreement.

The

"Confirmation Agreement" provided among other things that a
certain ore confirmation activities would occur at the expense
of the Plaintiff to determine the quality, or quantity of ore
deposits in the specific mining properties.

If it was

determined that a certain amount of silver then existed on the
properties, then the "Joint Venture Agreement" attached to and
made part of the Confirmation Agreement, in form of an o p t i o n ^ ^ ^ j ^ j ^ ^
MTCTOFI LM ED
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could be exercised by the Plaintiff requiring the infusion and
investment of certain funds by the Plaintiff in developing the
mining properties.
interest therein.

The Plaintiff would thereby obtain an
Further if the option (Joint Venture

Agreement) were not executed then plaintiff was to provide to
the Defendant a $500,000.00 line of credit in exchange for
certain collateral.

This Court on May 20th, 1986, made

findings and conclusions; and issued an Order therefrom.
The Court need not reiterate those findings and
conclusions, but suffice to say that they became the law of
the case and were not altered by motions made to the
contrary.

The Plaintiff by said Order was releived of its

obligation to extend the $500,000.00 line of credit to the
Defendant for the reason that the Defendant failed to provide
or tender to the Plaintiff marketable title.

Therein further

the Court granted the Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment,
releiving it of the obligation to provide the $500,000.00 line
of credit.
By Judge Call's ruling there remained for trial

as to

whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to
the Plaintiffs knowledge of or notice of the prior claim
against the Defendant or the subject properties thereby
precluding the Plaintiff from recinding the Confirmation
Agreement after considerable performance by the parties had
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occured.

This Court concludes that the Plaintiff was aware

and could have become more aware of the extent of the
(Hoffman) claim and its effect on the properties, the
Defendants ability to perform under the Contract; and the
weakness in the marketability of the title -to the properties
to be provided as collateral for the $500,000.00 line of
credit, or upon execution of the "Joint Venture Agreement",
the viability of the title to the properties in question.
Despite that, hoping for the best, the Plaintiff proceeded
with the confirmation project and explored the mine's
potential.

In October 1981, it became apparent to the

Plaintiff that the Defendant could not provide clear and
marketabale title, thereby releiving the Plaintiff of further
obligations including the requirement to extend the $500,00.00
line of credit.
This Court finds specifically however that there was
sufficient evidence that despite actual knowledge of or
knowledge that could have reasonably been accumulated and
acquired by the Plaintiff regarding the Hoffman claim, the
Plaintiff neverless went ahead with the confirmation project
under the agreement, thereby here precluding the Plaintiff
from seeking or obtaining recission of the Confirmation
Agreement.

The monies expended legitimately in connection

with the Confirmation Agreement were spent with knowledge of
or with the ability to gain knowledge of the extent of the
Hoffman claims and were spent in view of that risk.

When it
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became apparent that the Defendant could not produce a
marketable title, the Plaintiff had no further obligation
under the contract and in fact decided not to exercise its
option of the "Joint Venture Agreement".

The option period

was extended for approximately three years during which
further negotiations took place and during which the
defendant

attempted to obtain marketeable title or a policy

of title insurance.

Though such a policy was obtained, it was

not to the satisfaction of the Plaintiff and for that reason
and perhaps others the Plaintiff decided not to exercise its
option to execute the "Joint Venture Agreement".
There remain issues relative to the Defendant's claimed
lein, charges for storage and over-payments expended by the
Plaintiff.

With respect thereto the Court finds that the

Defendant is not entitled to any storage costs, as the storage
of the equipment occurred during the negotiation by the
parties and for their mutual benefit in trying to reach a
point at which the "Joint Venture" or some other agreement
could be executed.
The Court finds no basis for the claim made by the
Defendant for the storage costs and finds no legal basis for
the Defendant's claim of lien on the stored property.

The

Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment for the bond costs related
thereto in the sum of $3,600.00 as shown on Exhibit no. 33.
Although the Court has found that there is no basis for
recission in this case as the Plaintiff went ahead with its
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project despite the knowledge or the reasonably ascertainable
knowledge of the extent of the Hoffman claims, the Court finds
that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendant,
sums proved to have been paid to the Defendant on account of
billings which over-stated the actual and legitimate costs.
In that regard the contract provides that the expense to Dore
Metals of the Confirmation Agreement was to be on a "cost only
basis".

Defendant has argued that by some principal of law,

unclear to the Court, that the Plaintiff waived any claim for
recovery of those costs by way of payment and or failure to
make a claim immediately upon presentation.

This Court finds

however that no waiver occurred and that the Plaintiff is not
estopped at this time from claiming the repayment for those
sums which can be clearly shown to be beyond the actual or
reasonable costs incurred.
The first item in that regard is found on page two of
the contract, paragraph 4, subparagrpah (a), wherein the
Plaintiff was to provide to the Defendant a sum of $43,000.00
to buy timber for rehabilitation of the A-Level and for the
Miller cross cut.

There was some confusion by the testimony

as to just what work was done on the Miller cross-cut and or
the A-Level as related to this provision.

There is little

question that certain work was done, that timber was purchased
and used and in addition thereto, the $43,000.00 was supplied
and timber purchased which never left the lumber yard and was
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not used on the project.

Just whose responsibility it was to

use the timber on the project is unknown and why other timber
was purchased in addition to the $43,000.00 amount is also
unknown.

It would appear however that the Plaintiff and or

its agent, Marsten was as much at fault in not seeing that the
$43,000.00 worth of timber was used in the cross-cut instead
of additional timber as was the Defendant.

Further it would

appear that the $43,000.00 worth of timber though purchased,
is now of little or no value either to the mine operation or
otherwise; therefore the Court makes no order of restitution
with respect to said claim.
The Plaintiff also presented testimony relative to
certain sums to which the Defendant had little or no
explanation or documentation.
readily

verifiable.

The sums claimed are not

Exhibit no. 28 lists eight seperate sums

claimed as having been paid in excess of the Plaintiff's
contractual obligation.
The Court has reviewed the exhibits, particulary
Exhibit no. 25, 26, 28, and 39, and the testimony in regard to
the charges, expenses and disputes related thereto.
Item 1.

$43,000.00 advance for timber purchase to be

used on the A-Level and miller cross-cut, the Court
already addressed.
Item 2.

Advance against billings of $25,000.00.

That

sum by the testimony appeared to be a loan directly to
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Miller and not part of the K.

No direct claim is here

made for the same against Miller and the Court makes no
award thereon.
Item 3.

The $61,754.00 is comprised of those sums

claimed under Exhibit no. 26.

Most of the items found

therein were contested on the basis that no
satisfactory documentation was produced or that in the
opinion of Marsten, the charges were unreasonablly
high.

Some items were claimed to be for the defendant

Miller's own use; unrelated to the project or for
personal property purchased for and retained by the
Defendants.

Even when bolstered by testimony from

Marsten, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to
order reimbursement except as to the following:
1.

Under Paragraph 6 of Exhibit 26, the $295.80

for a gas tank.
2.

Under Paragraph 9, $804.00 for Kellogg, Idaho.

3.

Under Paragraph 14, $8,149.00 for new

transmission (plaintiffs already were paying rent
which should have covered repairs).
Item 4 & 5.

There is simply insufficient evidence

either way for the court to rule with respect
thereto.
Items 6 & 7.

The evidence was sufficient to

convince this court that these charges were not

-8related to the project in the sums of $2,288.00 and
$1,892.00.
Item 8.

There is sufficient confusion, lack of

records, and insufficient substantiation by both sides
to render the Court unable to determine the validity of
this claim and the Court therefore makes no order
thereon.

It is recognized sums were wired on

September 22, 1981, just days, according to Marston,
before the project was completed.

Just how the money

was used, whether it was justified, or otherwise is
unclear.

The testimony thereon was not detailed from

either side but was disputed. The Inter-office
Memorandum attached to Exhibit no. 26 and dated
February 20th, 1983 is the clearest statement we have,
but the Court is left with insufficient evidence to
find for the Plaintiff thereon.

In that regard, it

does not appear that the cost of the project greatly
exceeded the cost anticipated by the parties before its
commencement.
The Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the sum of
$13,428.80.

The issue of attorney fees was reserved and the

Court will entertain requests thereon.
Dated this AI
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day of August, 1988.

Memorandum Decision
(on attorney fees)

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DORE METALS & MINING CORP,
Plaintiff
VS

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

830018093

UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.
Defendant

On the 31st day of August 1988, this Court issued a
Memorandum Decision reserving the issue as to attorneys fees.
The issue arises under paragraph 7(c) of the Vipont Confirmation
Project Agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2) as follows:
"In the event that legal action shall be
necessary to enforce the provisions hereof,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys fees'.
This action arose originally by plaintiff seeking the return
of equipment owned by it, but held by the Defendant. The
Defendant brought a counter claim to enforce certain provisions of
the agreement, most specifically paragraph 5c. In response the
Plaintiff answered and moved to amend its complaint and alleged
therein a claim for recision and other damages. Judge Call made
findings and issued an Order on May 20, 1986, on issues with
respect to paragraph 5 (c).
The Defendant had brought legal action to "enforce the
provisions" of the Agreement, but therein was clearly not the
prevailing party.
With respect to the Plaintiffs claim for the return of the
equipment, though not specifically provided for in the agreement,
except as referred to under paragraph 4(3), the Plaintiff was the
prevailing party, as it was also with respect to the issue of the
ultimate responsibility for certain costs and expenses of the
operation of the project in the sum of $13,428.00
As to the claim of recision also brought by the Plaintiff,
the Plaintiff was not the prevailing party.
^
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The major issues consuming the majority of attorneys fees
were:
1. The $500,000 line of credit under paragraph 5.
2.. The Recision of the agreement and return of all funds
expended by the Plaintiff.
3. The return of equipment.
The other issues, though not insubstantial were overshadowed in
the effort expended on those issues above stated. The foregoing
is fairly confirmed by a review of the Affidavits filed by the
respective counsel as to billings.
The issues appear as follows:
1. With respect to the 5 (c) line of credit issue upon which
the Defendant did not prevail and Under the language of paragraph
7 (d) then, is the Plaintiff entitled to fees expended in
resisting Defendants efforts?
2. With respect to the issue of recision, since the Plaintiff
was not able to prevail thereon, and which was not actually an
effort to " enforce the provisions" of the contract, is the
Defendant entitled to fees expended in resisting Plaintiff's
efforts?
3. Although Plaintiff was successfull in obtaining the return
of its equipment and award of some funds, were those through
"enforcement of the provisions" of the Agreement?
The questions of "enforcement", "prevailing party", and
reciprocity, are at the heart of each of the 3 above stated
problems.
The Agreement was executed the 28th day of May 1981, thereby
making section 78-27-57 Utah Code Anotated inapplicable. The
Supreme Court in the case of Travner vs Cusiks P2d, 856 (1984) was
helpful in that it appears therein that this Court should consider
fees expended in successfully "enforcing the provisions" of the
Contract, and those for defending such claims if there is language
with respect to the "prevailing party", as there is here. The
language of the agreement further colors the problem as its speaks
of not only "enforcement" and "prevailing party", but further is
affected by the phrase "shall be necessary to enforce."
Using the direction of Travner Supra, and the reading of the
exact language of the Agreement, the Court finds as follows:
1. The Replevin action and fees expended therein was not
"necessary to enforce the provisions", but was brought only to

- 3 obtain the return of property owned by the Plaintiff. The action
arose from the relationship of the parties, but was not from the
"provisions" of the Agreement. Only Paragraph 4(b)(3) addresses
the equipment and then only part of it. It speaks of nothing with
respect to the return thereof, the continued ownership thereof,
storage fees, etc.
2. The litigation relative to the $500,000 line of credit
under paragraph 5 (c), was an effort by the Defendant to " enforce
the provisions", but upon which it failed. Under Travner, fees
are awardable to the Plaintiff for the defense of Defendant's
claims since the Plaintiff was the "prevailing party".
As to the sums to be awarded thereon, counsel for the
Plaintiff stated at the hearing that approximately 75% of
Plaintiff's time and effort was expended in defending said claims
by the Defendant under 5(c) of the Agreement. Since the Answer
and Counterclaim were filed the 9th of September 1983, all fees
expended prior thereto could not reasonably relate to that
defense. From September of 1983 until March of 1985 when the
Amended Complaint was filed, most of the efforts appear to be
geared to the defense of the Counterclaim, but could also be in
large part for preparation and filing of the Amended Complaint and
claim for recision.
There is little question that efforts regarding Summary
Judgment motions filed by both parties from February 1985 thru
August 1986 were for the most part directed at the defending
against Defendant's claim. Thereafter, though, some efforts were
expended in beating back the Defendant's renewed efforts at
attacking Judge Call's Order, most of the time expended was in
trial preparation.
Between the dates, however, of February 1985 when Defendant
filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and August of 1986
when the final hearing thereon was held, the Plaintiff appears to
have expended almost 500 hours of attorney's time possibly in
defense of said Counterclaim and Motion. The Court cannot
determine the exact number of hours spent exclusively thereon, but
it would be safe to find that at least one-half thereof apply
There was no real contest between the parties relative to the
reasonableness of the hourly fees. For the several attorneys
working for the plaintiff on the case, those fees ranged from
$35.00 per hour to $120 per hour. Roughly half of those were at
$120.00 per hour, approximately, one-third at $80 per hour, and
the balance at $40 per hour. It is noted that of the 1,507.30
total hours expended by Mr. Martineau's firm, about one-third are
critical to the time in question.The Court finds that the
attorney's fees payable for the efforts of Mr. Martineau's firm
are in the sum of $24,100. It is noted that of the 1,507.30 total
hours expended by Mr. Martineau's firm, about one-third are
critical to the time in question. The Court finds that
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- 4 approximately one-half of that costs are for defense of
defendant's Counterclaim.
Total assesable costs are $1830.00.
The fees expended with L. Robert Anderson appear to be in
part related to defense of defendant's Counterclaim, and the Court
therefore awards one-half thereof in the sum of $3,725. As to Mr.
Church, some hours were spent in direct connection with the
defense of defendant's counterclaim and the Court awards thereon
the sum of $1,000.
Total awarded to Plaintiff of attorney's fees is $28,825.00
plus $1,830.00 costs.
3 With respect to the plaintiff's claim for recision and
upon which it was unsuccessful, the Court does not find that such
was an effort to "enforce the provisions" of the Agreement. The
defendant then, though the prevailing party on that issue, is not
awarded fees thereon.
4. With respect to the successful claims of plaintiff which
were essentially for reimbursement, those were not brought for
enforcement of the "provisions", but in fact were outside the
terms and provisions of the contract. No fees are awarded thereon.
In thai:regard, Exhibit Number 19 apears to possibly add
provisions to the agreement, at least as far as the plaintiff
perceived its responsibilities or the effectuation of its
responsibilities. Exhibit Number 21 further confirms the same and
notes an expansion of the to be work performed and perhaps
evidences an amendment to the Agreement. Testimony at trial from
Miller and Marsten further somewhat supported that position. In
any event, it does not appear to this Court that they would rise
to the level that they would affect the outcome of this matter
with respect to the aplication of attorney's fees. No award of
attorney's fees is made, except as to plaintiff's defense of the
claim relative to the enforcement of paragraph 5(c) of the
agreement as above stated in the sum of $29,853.
Dated this 29th day of March 1989.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this 29th day of March, 1989, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Decision, postage prepaid, to Ray G. Martineau, Attorney for the
Plaintiff, 1800 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 and to Lloyd J. Webb, Attorney for the
Defendant, 155 2nd Avenue North, P.O. Box 1768, Twin Falls, Idaho
83303.
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tX^dtozct-J
iristine Morrison
Deputy Court Clerk
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Conclusions of Law

RAY G. MARTINEAU
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
THOMAS H. CHURCH
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW
1354 Albion Avenue
P.O. Box 1286
Burley, Idaho 83318
Telephone: (208) 678-0988
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DORE METALS AND MINING
CORPORATION, a corporation,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.,
a corporation,

Civil No. 830018093 CN

Defendant.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial
before the Court sitting without a jury on June 8, 1988 for an
adjudication of the five remaining issues identified in Section
V of Plaintiff's Trial Brief as not having been theretofore
resolved by the prior rulings of the Court and the stipulation
of the parties, the plaintiff appearing by and through its
counsel Ray G. Martineau and Thomas H. Church and the dfe|QBlbg&a£
-1-
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appearing by and through its president Thomas F. Miller and its
counsel Lloyd J. Webb and Roger F. Baron, and the Court having
heard and considered the evidence offered and presented on
behalf of each of the parties during the course of the trial
which continued through June 10, 1988, and the Court having
subsequently heard and considered the statements and arguments
of counsel presented at the hearing before the Court on August
11, 1988 and the Court having thereafter issued its Memorandum
Decision herein dated August 31, 1988 and the Court having
reviewed and considered the Affidavits and Verified Memorandum
concerning cost and attorneyTs fees submitted on behalf of the
parties, and the Court having heard and considered the statements and arguments of counsel presented at the hearing before
the Court on February 22, 1989, and the Court having thereafter
issued its Memorandum Decision herein dated March 29, 1989, and
the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefor now makes and enters the following:
FINDING OF FACTS
1.

The following facts heretofore found and adjudi-

cated by the Court to exist as a matter of law and without
substantial controversy by its Order Determining Uncontroverted
Facts And Conclusions Of Law dated May 20, 1986 ("Courts May
20, 1986 Order") are now the "law of the case" in this proceeding, are hereby reaffirmed and are by this reference incor-2-

porated herein and made a part hereof:
(a)

The parties contemplated at the time the

Confirmation Agreement was entered into that defendant
would, within the time provided therein, tender to
plaintiff marketable title to the Vipont mining properties ("Properties") free and clear of all liens and
encumbrances and reasonable certainty of freedom from
the hazards of litigation.
(b) Defendant breached its obligations to tender
marketable title to the Properties to plaintiff.
(c) The title insurance commitment that was provided by defendant to plaintiff in late 1982 was not
the equivalent of marketable title.
2.

Plaintiff reasonably relied upon defendant's

undertaking under the Confirmation Agreement to tender marketable title to the Properties.
3.

Following the execution of the Confirmation

Agreement the parties, under the direction of Marston & Marston
as the prime contractor and defendant as a subcontractor
working on a "cost only basis", entered into the performance of
the Confirmation Project on a fast track basis and completed
the same on or about September 26, 1981.
4.

Plaintiff did not, prior to on or about October

15, 1981, learn of the full nature and extent of Paul Hoffman's
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claims that (a) he had invested over $400,000.00 in the
Properties, (b) that he was the owner of a 25% interest
therein, (c) that he held an option to acquire an additional
25% interest therein, (d) that he was entitled to 80% of the
net operating revenues therefrom until all sums he had advanced
had been repaid in full, and (e) that he fully intended to pursue his claims in connection with the litigation he had theretofore initiated and that then remained pending undetermined
against defendant in the State of Idaho.
5.

The extension by the parties from time to time of

the deadline for plaintiff to exercise its option under the
Confirmation Agreement to enter into the Joint Venture was for
the purpose of enabling defendant to resolve its title problems
and thereby enable it to tender marketable title to the
Properties.
6.

Plaintiff was at all times during the period com-

mencing October 14, 1981 and ending February 3, 1983 ready,
willing and able to exercise its option to enter into the Joint
Venture and fulfill all of its obligations in connection
therewith and the only reason plaintiff did not do so was
defendants failure to tender marketable title, as reflected by
the following facts:
(a)

Plaintiff wire transferred $1,600,000.00 to

a bank in Twin Falls, Idaho prior to October 14, 1981,
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and plaintiff's officers were present in Twin Falls,
Idaho on October 14 and 15, 1981 fully prepared to
enter into the Joint Venture Agreement on behalf of
plaintiff.
(b)

Plaintiff expended the sum of $595,482.55 in

connection with the Confirmation Agreement,
$100,000.00 of which was wire transferred to defendant
on September 22, 1981, just four days prior to the
completion of the Confirmation Project, to "be utilized through October 16, 1981 to further rehabilitate
the A-Level" workings on the
(c)

Properties.

In mid-1982 plaintiff (i) provided defendant

with a copy of the Marston & Marston Report, although
plaintiff had no legal obligation to do so, and (ii)
arranged for one of its affiliates to make a personal
loan to defendant's president, Tom Miller, and his
wife in the amount of $45,000.00.
(d)

Plaintiff left its equipment ("Equipment"),

for which it paid over $100,000.00, in defendant's
care at the Properties so that the same would be
readily available for use by the Joint Venture, there
being no other reason for plaintiff leaving its
Equipment in defendant's care.
(e)

Bill Fillman, plaintiff's them president,
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with the aid of the Marston & Marston Report, expended
substantial time and effort throughout 1982 negotiating with various financial institutions in Canada
and the United States to determine what institutional
financing might be available to the Joint Venture,
(f)

Plaintiff never

waived, released or other-

wise relinquished its option to enter into the Joint
Venture, nor did it ever release defendant from its
obligation to tender marketable title.
(g)

Subsequent to February 3, 1983 Steven

Friedrich, the person who was most directly involved
in the negotiations and dealings with defendant on
plaintiff's behalf, sought the release by plaintiff of
its interest in the Properties so that he could go
forward in concert with defendant in the development
and operation of the Properties,
(h)

Defendant's failure to tender marketable

title was the sole cause of plaintiff not exercising
its option,
7.

Of the $284,474.00 that was paid to defendant

under the Confirmation Agreement, $13,428.80 was either
unjustified on a "cost only basis" or plaintiff failed to properly substantiate the same on the basis of appropriate and
necessary documentation.

These unjustified billings included
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the charging of:
(a)

The sum of $295.80 for a gas tank that was

retained by defendant,
(b)

The sum of $804.00 for a trip to Kellogg,

Idaho that unrelated to the Confirmation Project.
(c)

The sum of $8,149.00 for a new transmission

where plaintiff was already paying rent which covered
such repairs.
(d)

The sum of $2,288.00 for excess indirect

overhead charges.
(e)

The sum of $1,892.00 for hours billed for

personnel not working on the Confirmation Project.
8.

There was never any agreement between the parties

that plaintiff would be billed or would pay any storage charges
for defendant to store plaintifffs Equipment.

It was simply

agreed between them that plaintiff's Equipment would remain in
the care of defendant for the mutual benefit of the parties,
pending the anticipated prompt resolution of defendant's title
problems so that the Joint Venture could go forward and the
Equipment could be utilized in connection therewith.
9.

It was only because of plaintiff's belief that

the existing title problems would be promptly resolved, coupled
with plaintiff's substantial investment and compelling interest
in going forward with the Joint Venture, that plaintiff's
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Equipment was left in the defendant's care,
10.

During the period that plaintiff's Equipment was

in defendant's care, defendant exercised at least the degree of
care for such Equipment that it did for its own,
11.

At no time prior to late April or early May of

1983 did defendant (a) advise plaintiff that defendant would
assert any claim for the storage of plaintiff's Equipment, (b)
advise plaintiff of the amount defendant intended to claim for
storage charges, (c) provide plaintiff with the alternative
choice of making other arrangements for the storage of plaintiff's Equipment, (d) make any independent inquiry in the local
area as the availability of alternative storage facilities at
competitive prices, (e) obtain any legal opinion with regard
to defendant's potential liability for any damage to or loss of
plaintiff's Equipment, or (f)

make any effort to determine the

availability and cost of insurance coverage for plaintiff's
Equipment.
12.

There was no valid basis for defendant's claim of

a right to a lien upon plaintiff's Equipment or for storage
charges for the storage by defendant of the same and as a consequence plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant plaintiff's costs in the amount of $3,600.00 relating to the posting
of the bond as required by the Court herein in order for plaintiff to recover possession of its Equipment.
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13.

Plaintiff has been required to employ the attor-

ney's appearing herein on its behalf to enforce the provisions
of the Confirmation Agreement and has agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable attorney's fee for their services herein.
Plaintiff has incurred reasonable and necessary attorney's fees
in the amount of $28,825.00 and reasonable and necessary costs
in the amount of $1,830.00 in connection with plaintiff's
efforts to enforce the provisions of the Confirmation
Agreement.
From the foregoing Finding of Fact the Court hereby
makes the following:
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The Court's May 20, 1986 Order, including the

Conclusions of Law set forth therein which are now the law of
this case, are hereby reaffirmed and by this reference
incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
2.

The Court's Order Granting Partial Summary

Judgment And Order On Motions Fro Partial Summary Judgment
herein dated May 20, 1986 in hereby reaffirmed and by this
reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
3.

Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a judgment

and decree herein in its favor and against defendant for the
sum of $13^28.00 representing sums of plaintiff was billed and
paid .that were not justified on a "cost only basis" as provided
-9-

by the Confirmation Agreement, together with interest thereon
at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from and after
October 15, 1981 until judgment, for the sum of $28,825.00
representing attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily
incurred by plaintiff in enforcing the provisions of the
Confirmation Agreement, for the sum of $3,600,00 representing
the costs incurred by plaintiff in connection with the posting
of the bond herein in connection with the recovery of plaintiff's Equipment, and for the sum of $1,830.00 representing the
costs plaintiff reasonably and necessarily incurred in
enforcing the provisions of the Confirmation Agreement.
MADE AND ENTERED this J^j

day of ^JIJJVU

1989.

Gordon "J.~ Low
"TTi s t r i c t C o u r t / J u d g e
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Certificate of Service
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Finding Of
Fact And Conclusion Of Law to the following individuals on this
«Dt

day of April, 1989.
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq.
Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine
155 2nd Avenue North
P. 0. Box 1768
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768
Roger F. Baron, Esq.
Bunderson & Baron
45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302
\£r>?*-siyx.
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Judgment

RAY G. MARTINEAU
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
THOMAS H. CHURCH
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW
1354 Albion Avenue
P.O. Box 1286
Burley, Idaho 83318
Telephone: (208) 678-0988
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DORE METALS AND MINING
CORPORATION, a c o r p o r a t i o n ,

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.,
a corporation,

Civil No. 830018093 CN

Defendant.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial
before the Court sitting without a jury on June 8, 1988 for an
adjudication of the five remaining issues identified in Section
V of Plaintiff's Trial Brief as not having been theretofore
resolved by the prior rulings of the Court and the stipulation
of the parties, the plaintiff appearing by and through its
counsel Ray G. Martineau and Thomas H. Church and the defendant

Number,
"1"
MICROFILMED

MICROFILMED
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appearing by and through its president Thomas F. Miller and its
counsel Lloyd J. Webb and Roger F. Baron, and the Court having
heard and considered the evidence offered and presented on
behalf of each of the parties during the course of the trial
which continued through June 10, 1988, and the Court having
subsequently heard and considered the statements and arguments
of counsel presented at the hearing before the Court on August
11, 1988 and the Court having thereafter issued its Memorandum
Decision herein dated August 31, 1988 and the Court having
reviewed and considered the Affidavits and Verified Memorandum
concerning cost and attorney's fees submitted on behalf of the
parties, and the Court having heard and considered the statements and arguments of counsel presented at the hearing before
the Court on February 22, 1989, and the Court having thereafter
issued its Memorandum Decision herein dated March 29, 1989, and
the Court having heretofore made and entered its Finding of
Fact and Conclusion of Law herein and the Court being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor
hereby enters Judgment as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff be and it is hereby awarded judgment against defendant for
the sum of $13,^28.00, together with interest thereon at the
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from and after October 15,
1981 to and including the date hereof, which interest is in the
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as of the date hereof, for the sum of

sum of $

$5,430.00 costs, and for the sura of $28,825.00 attorneyfs fees
as of the date hereof, subject to such additional award of
attorney's fees as may be just and equitable in the premises in
the event of any appeal or further proceedings herein,
MADE AND ENTERED this I °[

day of ^jliTUJ

,

1989-

Gp^tfon J. /Low
District CourtXjudge

Certificate of Service
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of
Judgment to the following individuals on this ^>C

day of

April, 1989.
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq.
Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine
155 2nd Avenue North
P. 0. Box 1768
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768
Roger F. Baron, Esq,
Bunderson & Baron
45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302

APPENDIX "H"
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VIPONT CONFIRMATION PROJECT AGREEMENT
IT IS AGREED this
go
day of May, 1981, by and between the parties
here specified according to the t e r m s hereof:
*•

Parties:

The parties to this agreement a r e :

United Silver Mines, Inc., a Utah corporation, Box 267, Oakley, Idaho
83346, hereinafter called "United", and
Dore Metals and Mining Corporation, a Nevada corporation, Box 11850,
Saint Louis, Missouri, 63105, hereinafter called "Dore".
2*

Purpose:

The purpose of this agreement is:

(a)
To give Dore the exclusive right to prove ore reserves located upon
properties owned by United Silver Mines, Inc. It is the desire of Dore to confirm reserves
containing at least one million ounces of recoverable silver.
(b)
To prove reserves of at least 100,000 ounces of silver in the A-level
and Phelan dumps to qualify those dumps as collateral for a $500,000 line of credit from
Dore to United for work on the Miller X-cut.
(c)

To grant unto Dore certain option rights herein specified.

3.
United Agrees:
contained, United agrees:

In consideration of the mutual covenants here

(a)
To grant to Dore the exclusive rights for the five-month period from
May 15, 1981 through October 15, 1981, to perform a confirmation project on its Vipont
claims (53 patented lode mining claims) located in the Ashbrook Mining -District, Box
Elder County, Utah.
(b)
To grant to Dore the exclusive option to enter into a joint venture
agreement with United, provided that the option to enter into t h a t agreement shall be
exercised on or before October 15, 1981, according to the t e r m s of the joint venture
agreement this day approved by t h e parties to this agreement, and according to no other
terms (copy attached).
(c)
To rehabilitate, including the employment of manual labor, timber,
explosives, permits and other facilities necessary to that rehabilitation, the A-level
cross-cut and to generally make the workings thereof safe for consultants employed by
Dore to sample and evaluate materials, at the expense of Dore on a cost only basis.
(d)
To make available all mine maps or records as required by the
consultants for their evaluation and assist them as required.
4.
Pore Agrees:
contained, Dore agrees:

In consideration of the mutual covenants here
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(a)
To pay to United $43,000.00 as a non-refundable payment to be used
to purchase timber for the A-level rehabilitation and for the Miller cross-cut.
(b)
To undertake a confirmation project as to United l s properties
situated as here specified, including the following specific a c t i v i t i e s :
(1)
To reopen the A-level cross-cut a t Dore*s expense utilizing the
efforts and material of United as specified above and to thoroughly sample
the old mine workings as necessary in the opinion of Dore ! s consultant to
confirm ore reserves suggested by old mine maps and records.
(2)
To surface-drill several holes between the previously drilled
V-holes and the old workings, i.e. Phelan level, and other holes as required.
(3)

To trench and sample from the surface as required.

(4)

To surface sample and map.

(5)
To retain the services of Marston and Marston or equivalent
consultants to perform the project.
(6)

To sample and measure the A-level and Phelan dumps.

(7)

To do other necessary work as deemed necessary by Dore.

As to the confirmation project:
(1)
It is understood and agreed that the expense thereof shall be
exclusively Dore*s;
(2)
It is agreed by United and Dore t h a t the core-drilling will be
done by a competent core driller, such as Boyles Brothers, Longyear, e t c .
with approval by United and Dore;
(3)
It is agreed Dore will furnish United with an appropriate Load
Haul Dump (LHD) machine for this work, a generator of appropriate size,
and a mine fan for ventilation;
(4)
It is agreed that the confirmation project shall in no way
interfere with United*s heap leach process, which will be going on
simultaneously on the property. The old tailings shall remain the sole
ownership of United. The old mine dumps on the property shall remain the
sole ownership of United until and unless the option for joint venture is
exercised.
5.
If the Option for Joint Venture is not Exercised:
In the event that
Dore does not exercise the option to enter into the joint venture according to the terms
of agreement thereof, on or before October 15, 1981:
(a)

Dore forefeits all rights arising by this or any other agreement with

United.
(b)
All results of sampling, including assays, drill-core maps, etc.,
become the sole possession of United.
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(c)
Dore must grant United a $500,000 line of credit for five (5) years
secured by the A-level and Phelan dumps if the sampling and measurement activity on
those dumps confirms at least 100,000 ounces of silver. Said confirmation activity must
be completed within four (4) weeks of the date of this agreement and the line of credit
established upon presentation to Dore of title to said dumps as collateral and the
consultants report confirming 100,000 ounces of silver.
Repayment of t h e principal balance borrowed against said line of
credit shall begin a t the end of t h e thirty-sixth (36) month of t h e loan agreement and
shall be at the r a t e of $20,833 per month. Interest on outstanding balances will be
payable monthly and will be computed daily a t the greater of 16% per annum or the most
recent rate paid by the U. S. Treasury for 26-week Treasury Bills.
6.
If the Option is Exercised:
In the event t h a t the option to enter
into the joint venture agreement according to its terms is exercised on or before October
15, 1981, Dore shall be permitted to transfer t h e costs incurred in the confirmation
project to the joint venture for reimbursement as an expense of the joint venture,
provided that Dore is not permitted to transfer more than $300,000.00 to the joint
venture in that regard. United shall be permitted t o transfer any outstanding balance on
its line of credit per \f2(b) to t h e joint venture line of credit t o be extended by Dore as
part of the venture agreement.
7.
General Terms of Agreement:
agreement shall apply:

The following general terms of

(a)
Dore ! s rights under this agreement a r e wholly non-assignable, and in
the event of any attempted assignment, its rights shall lapse and whatever investment it
shall have made shall be forfeited to United.
(b)
Dore agrees to assume liability for and t o hold United harmless by
reason of its activities, either individually or through contractors and subcontractors, in
connection with the confirmation project and agrees to carry necessary liability
insurance, at its own premium expense, in a reputable casualty insurance company for
that purpose.
(c)

United agrees t o provide workmen's compensation insurance for its

employees.
(d)
In the event that legal action shall be necessary to enforce the
provisions hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney fee.
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.

By ^jitn^^i

J?! h^/As7 .

- ' T h o m a s F . Milier '
President

DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION

By £Z*^^(2z£
E u g ^ e M. Goldtnan
President
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STATE OF IDAHO
ss.

County of Cassia

On this <TQ_ day of May, 1981, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in
and for said State and County, personally appeared THOMAS F. MILLER, President of
UNITED SILVER MIN£s, INC., the corporation whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation e x e r t e d the same.
/>• / /
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have herexfittf/iei
ffiy/fi^{find
affixed my official
seal, the day and year in this certificate first
NOTARY PUBLIC^FDR IDAHO
R e s i d e n c e / \/"7p,W
F&/fe,

, ^y
3d&x&

...
> '
«/ /

STATE OF MISSOURI
County of St. Louis

)
)
)

ss.

On this g&?„^ day of May, 1981. before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in
and for said State and County, personally appeared EUGENE M. GOLDMAN, President of
DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION, the corporation whose name is subscribed
to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the
same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written.
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR MISSOURI
Residence; r £ y < AJ/n^+r I* /> 6, f/cr,js««t.
Commission expires: ~ ^ ^
^
, 9 , ^

0
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•VIPONT JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT

of

This Joint Venture agreement entered into and effective this
, 1981, by and between:

day

UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., a Utah corporation, P. 0 . Box 267, Oakley,
Idaho 83346, hereinafter called "United", and
DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, P. 0 .
Box 11850*, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, hereinafter called "Dore".
1.

Purpose of Joint Venture:

The'purpose of the Joint Venture is to combine property, skill, knowledge, and
financial resources to explore for, develop, and mine silver, gold, and other ores from a
property presently owned by Bannock Silver Mining Co., a Utah corporation, herein
designated as "Bannock", located in the Ashbrook Mining District, Box Elder County,
Utah, known as the Vipont Silver Mine, and other properties located within two (2) miles
of the present boundaries of the Vipont Silver Mine.
2.

.Ownership:

Vipont shall be a Joint Venture of the parties with 50% interest therein in
each party, provided, however, t h a t the mining properties now owned by Bannock shall
remain in United ! s ownership until such time as the $6 million credit contemplated herein
shall have been fully advanced to Vipont. At that time, Dore shall be deeded a one-half
fee simple ^interest in those properties, and pending that time, a deed for that purpose
shall be placed and held in escrow with Zion's First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah,
herein designated as "Zion ! s", conveying that interest from United to Dore.
If, for any reason, the contemplated credit is not advanced, the properties
will remain in the ownership of United and, upon its demand, the deed of partial interest
therein shall be returned to United by the escrow a g e n t .
3.

Name of Joint Venture and Principal Office:

(a)

The name of the Joint Venture shall be Vipont.

(b)
The principal office of the Joint Venture shall be at 207 South Wilson,
P. O. Box 267, Oakley, Idaho 83346. The Joint Venture shall conduct business at such
location and in any additional locations as may, from time to time, be determined.

4.

Term of Joint Venture:

The Joint Venture shall continue from the date hereof until cancelled either
upon breach hereof or upon mutual consent of the parties.
No venturers shall have the right to voluntarily withdraw from the Joint
Venture,
5.

Management;

The Joint Venture shall be managed as follows:
(a)
The Joint Venture shall have four directors.
The Chairman and
President of United will serve as the Managing Director and the Chairman and President
of LLC Corporation, the President of Dore, and a Vice-President or the SecretaryTreasurer of United will act as the other directors.
(b)
United and Dore agree to consult together concerning the exploration,
development and mining work to be done pursuant to this agreement, but the final
decision concerning the work to be done and the manner of performance shall be made by
United provided that such work is accomplished a t a cost not to exceed 115% of the
estimated costs specified in VI2 hereof and the various tasks are completed within sixty
(60) days of a Master Project Schedule, a t t a c h e d to this agreement as "Schedule A" and
by this reference made a part hereof, to be developed by United with assistance, as
required, from Dore. Should unforeseen delays not due to weather or other Acts of God
in excess of sixty (60) days or cost overruns in excess of 115% of the estimate occur,
Dore may request United to retain the services of a recognized consulting firm whose
recommendations as to completion of work, if acceptable to Dore shall be binding on
United.
(c)
The Managing Director shall have full authority to make all
disbursements for the Joint Venture, to execute all documents, and to generally manage
the Joint Venture business.
(d)
United will be the operator and manager of the Vipont Silver Mine and
will be subject only to major policy determinations of Vipont. United will o p e r a t e the
mine solely on a cost-only basis.
6.

Property:

United will make available a first deed of trust on
claims, controlled by United and owned by Bannock, known as the
loans to the Joint Venture made by Dore*s lender, Oklahoma
designated as "Morris", consistent with V10 hereof. The property
follows:
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the following mining
"Property", to secure
Morris Plan, herein
is described herein as

if

•\J4"

Fifty three (53) patented lode mining claims in Section 31, T. 15 N., R. 17 W.;
Sections 6 and 7, T. 14 N., K. 17 W.; Section 36, T. 15 N., R. 18 W.; and
Sections 1 and 12, T. 14 N., R. 18 W. - Salt Lake Meridian, Ashbrook Mining
District, Box Elder County, Utah (the '.'Property"), consisting of
approximately 1,000 acres and more particularly described as follows:
Claims

Patent No.
42134
42134
42134
42134
42134
42134
42134
42134
42134
42134
24640
24639
24642
24577
24576
24576
24643
24641
24578

Catherine, Nos. 1-6
Contact Mine, Nos. 1-3
Dugway, Nos. 1-6, 8-20
Fraction
Northern, 1-5
Park, Nos. 1-4
Poorman
Sentinel Mine No. 2
Southern Nos. 1-3
West End
Argenta
Black
Champion
plipper
Homestake
Homestake Millsite
Lexington
Mahogany
Sentinel
Contribution by United;

United agrees to make the following contributions to the Joint Venture:
(a)
To grant unto Dore's lender, Morris, a first deed of trust on the Vipont
Claims Group known as the "Property", described herein in detail. The deed of trust will
be placed in escrow in Zion's First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah ("ZionV) until
such time as the escrow requirements are fully performed by Dore and its lender.
(b)

To act as the Managing Director and Manager of the Joint Venture.

(c)

To manage and operate the Vipont Silver Mine.

(d)
To deed 50% of the Vipont claims to Dore upon satisfaction of Dore's
promises contained herein.
8.

Contribution by Pore:

Dore agrees to make available the following contributions to the capital of
the Joint Venture:
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(a)
Provide a two-year irrevocable line of credit totalling $6 million during
the first two years of this agreement, according to the Development and Mine Operation
Plan specified in 1112 hereof and Schedule A per l!5(b) hereof.
The above money will be loaned to the Joint Venture so long as the project is
within 115% of the estimated amounts and so long as no part of the project is more than
60 days behind the scheduled dates set out in Schedule A and shall bear interest and be
repayable as per schedule under Loans, 1110 hereof.
Should the costs needed for the accomplishment of the Plan, per 1112 hereof
exceed 115% of the estimated amounts, Dore will provide additional loans to the extent
needed for the accomplishment thereof pursuant to the recommendations of a consultant
per l!5.(b), hereof.
(bj
Transfer its confirmation results to the Joint Venture at cost, but not to
exceed $300,000.00.
9.

Vipont's Reimbursement to Joint Venture Parties:

Upon the signing of this agreement, Vipont will do the following:
(a)
Acquire the confirmation
reimbursed not to exceed $300,000.00 total.

results from

Dore at cost, Dore to be

(b)
Pay United for its investment to date in the Vipont Claims. This
includes property purchase, buildings, equipment, improvements, i.e. roads, samplings,
Miller X-cut, etc., in the approximate amount of $700,000.00.
(c)
Assume the note from United to Dore secured by the A-level and Phelan
dumps, the proceeds of which were used to further construct the Miller cross-cut.
10.

Loans:

All loans made to the Joint Venture shall be secured by a first deed of trust
("Deed") on the "Property". This deed of trust will be placed in escrow at Zion's and will
remain there until the $6 million commitment is loaned to Vipont, or for two years,
whichever occurs first, at which time it will be transferred to Dore ! s lender, the
Oklahoma Morris Plan ("Morris"), provided that Dore shall have then fully honored its
loan commitments here contained, or until United shall determine that sufficient capital
of lesser amount has been expended to maintain a viable operation.
Morris shall have in its possession the Deed until the loans have been repaid in
full, at which time the Deed will be relinquished to the Joint Venture.
The above loans will be reduced starting the end of the 9th quarter of this
agreement. Until the loans have been repaid, all net revenues, as defined in 1112 hereof,
shall be divided as follows: 40% to repay the Dopcyloan balance, 30% to Dore and 30% to
United. The loans will be paid in full by the enp of five y e a r s . The loan repayment
schedule will be automatically extended beyond the five years where Acts of God, such
as fire, flood, strikes, war, or major government-caused economic conditions prevail, for
\ ^ \

the length of time of the condition specified. If not repaid within five years, 100% of the
net revenues shall be paid to Dore for application upon the loans until they shall be
paid. Once the loans have been repaid, net revenues shall be divided 50% to United and
50% to Dore.
Loan balances outstanding will bear interest at the greater of 16% per annum,
or the most recent rate paid by the U.S. Treasury for 26-week Treasury Bills, computed
daily and payable monthly.
All major equipment purchases can be made on a turnkey lease from Dore to
Vipont. The amount of the turnkey lease, with a fixed 16% annual interest factor, will be
deducted from the $6 million credit line from Dore. Vipont shall own the equipment at
the end of the lease term.
United shall have the option to pay up to 100% of its share of net revenues to
payment of loans whenever it shall deem it appropriate and Dore shall concurrently make
an equal payment from its share.
11.

Bank Accounts:

Upon the execution hereof, Dore shall deposit at least $500,000.00 into a
Vipont account at a bank to be chosen by the directors and agrees thereafter to maintain
that account at a* balance of at least $250,000.00 by replenishing that account at least
monthly so that adequate working capital for the venture shall be available in accordance
with the Master Project Schedule A.
All Joint Venture bank accounts shall be subject to draws by signatories at
the exclusive designation of the Managing Director.
12.

Development and Mine Operation;

The Vipont Silver Mine (Property) will be developed by United as is outlined
under Proposed Development, page 2,2 and 24 of the T. F. Miller report dated January 15,
1981. Estimated costs to complete development and commence production is $2,260,000
as outlined on page 23 of said report. The lead time to commence production of ore and
concentrate shall not exceed eighteen (18) months from date of this agreement except as
extended on a day-for-day basis to offset delays caused by Acts of God.
The objective is to build a selective flotation mill of 150-200 TPD capacity,
with a silver-gold precipitation unit to further reduce the silver-gold concentrates.
Ultimately, it is the goal of Vipont to make its own bullion. The estimated cost of this
milling facility is $2,000,000.00. Total mine and mill development costs are estimated to
be $4,260,000.00 including production start-up.
After commercial mining shall have commenced, all ores produced shall
belong to and be owned by United and Dore as their interest shall appear as provided in
1110 hereof, first subject, however, to all costs and expenses, direct or indirect, which
shall properly be allocated to development, mining, milling, and marketing of said ores.
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Before the distribution of any net revenues to Dore or United, according to
^110 hereof, occurs, there shall first be established and thereafter maintained a working
capital and contingency fund equivalent" to sustain three months mining and milling
operations and to conduct strategic exploration to prove or discard all potential ore
sources within two miles of the present boundaries of the Vipont. Silver Mine.
13.

Additional Properties:

All mining claims or other mineral property acquired within two miles of the
present boundaries of the Vipont Silver Mine shall be for the benefit of both parties and
shall be subject to the terms of this agreement so far as the interests of the parties
hereto are concerned.
14.

Dumps:

Existing dumps located on the property shall become the property of the Joint
Venture upon its assumption of the note balance owed Dore by United for funds borrowed
to further develop the Miller cross-cut.
15.

Grazing Lease:

A surface grazing lease previously assigned to Thomas F. Miller for the
grazing of livestock on the properties shall remain in effect. However, in no way will
livestock grazing'be permitted to interfere with mining or exploration activities.
16.

Fiscal Year and Accounting:

The fiscal year of the Joint Venture shall end on December 31 and books of
the Joint Venture shall be kept on a cash, accrual or other basis as the directors shall
determine, and shall be kept in accordance with accounting principles employed by the
Joint Venture for State and Federal income tax purposes. The books of the venture shall
be audited annually by a Certified Public Accounting firm selected by the Managing
Director and approved by the remaining director.
17.

Allocation of Deductions:

The depletion allowance, leases, deductions and credits for State and Federal
income tax purposes shall be allocated as follows: 50% to United and 50% to Dore.
18.

Inurement-Assignment:

This agreement shall inure to and be binding upon the parties hereto, their
successors and assigns.
Except by merger or consolidation with another corporation, neither party to
this agreement may sell or dispose of any of its interests in this Joint Venture except to
a party of equal integrity and financial responsibility, and then only after the other party
shall have had the option to purchase on like terms and conditions for a period of 90 days
after receiving written notice of the desire of the other party to sell, which notice shall
give the name of the party offering to buy and the terms and conditions of the proposed
sale.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF/ the parties have hereunto authorized its duly
appointed officers to set its hand hereto the day and year first above written.
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.
By

.
Thomas F. Miller
President

DORE'METALS AND MINING CORPORATION
By
Eugene M, Goldman
President
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

County of Twin Palls

ss.

)

On this
day of
, 1981, before me, the undersigned, a
Notary Public in and for said State and County, personally appeared THOMAS F.
MILLER, President of UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., the corporation whose name is
subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation
executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written.
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residence:
STATE OF MISSOURI
County of St. Louis
On this
a Notary Public in and
GOLDMAN, President of
whose name is subscribed
corporation executed the

)
)
)

ss.

day of
f 1981, before me, the undersigned,
for said State and County, personally appeared EUGENE M.
DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION, the corporation
to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that such
same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official
seal, the day and year in this certificate first above written.
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR MISSOURI
Residence:
Commission expires:
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Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc.,
116 Idaho 240, 775 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1989)

the record of this case, we are satisfied
that the defendant's fear was genuine.
This is not to say that in all cases the
defendant cannot be required to provide
the prosecution with information as a
condition of probation. See United
States v. Worcester, 190 F.Supp. 548
(D.C.Mass.1961). But such conditions
should not attach when compliance would
subject the defendant to a serous risk of
harm. If there are reasonable means of
eliminating such a risk, such as conducting the sentencing proceedings behind
closed doors with the record sealed, then
such conditions might be proper. However, in the instant case the damage
has been done. The court's offer was a
matter of public record and there are
no steps which can now be taken to
undo the harm.
State v. Langford, 12 Wash.App. 228, 529
P.2d 839, 840 (1974).
Ill
If I correctly read that which Justice
Bakes has written, he would affirm and
test the waters, whereas I would not. The
onerous condition of probation at issue
here should be stricken by the trial court.
I would feel in more comfortable surroundings if my colleagues were of the same
mind. It is not even a close case as to
what our course of action should be. The
trial court set the stage so we could decide
the matter once and for all, but, no, not to
be, not at this time—which seems to becoming a habit. I believe that the trial court
was entirely correct in placing the ball in this
court, and have little doubt that with a little
leadership from this Court Mr. Badgley's life
will not be offered up as was that of Denise
Williams.
IV
All that has to be kept in mind here is
that probation is granted as a rehabilitative
measure. It is not a tool to be used to
coerce offenders into gathering evidence as
an arm of the prosecution even where the
defendant's life is not endangered—much
less so where, as here, the danger is real

and palpable as testified to by the tragic
and unnecessary death of Denise Williams.
JOHNSON, Justice, concurring
specially.
I concur with Chief Justice Bakes that
the appeal should not be dismissed. I concur with the majority that the imposition of
the condition of probation is not per se
erroneous and that the case be remanded
to the trial court for a determination
whether Badgley's refusal to accept the
condition of probation is reasonable under
all the facts and circumstances.

116 Idaho 240

Paul HOFFMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
UNITED SILVER iMINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16861.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
April 3, 1989.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1989.
Petition for Review Denied
July 11, 1989.
Limited partner brought action against
general partner of limited partnership seeking compelled accounting, grant of access
to partnership's books, damages for denial
of access to those books, and declaration he
had fully performed his phase I obligation,
entitling him to 25% interest in partnership.
Genera\ partner counterdaimea, aYieging
limited partner had breached obligation to
furnish $750,000 funds, seeking damages
for alleged breach and declaration that limited partner was entitled to nothing from
partnership. The District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County, George Granata, Jr., J., entered judgment upon jury
verdict declaring limited partner to be owner of 25% interest in partnership and

HOFFMAN v. UNITED SILVER MINES, INC.

Idaho

133

Cite as 775 P.2d 132 (Idaho App. 1989)

awarding him other relief, and general
partner appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Burnett, J., held that: (1) partnership
agreement was ambiguous as to whether
limited partner was required to furnish full
$750,000 or only $400,000 of that amount to
fulfill his obligation in phase I, with remainder of funds to be derived from operation for leaching of silver from tailings and
dumps, and evidence supported determination that intent was to impose upon limited
partner obligation to furnish only $400,000
during phase I, and (2) partnership agreement could not be construed as entitling
limited partner to 25% interest in partnership before total investment, including any
net profits from leaching operation, totalled $750,000.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part; and
remanded.
1. Contracts e=>176(2)
Whether agreement is ambiguous is
question of law.
2. Contracts <®=>176(1)
If contract is not ambiguous, its interpretation is question of law to be determined by trial judge rather than by jury.
3. Contracts <3=>176(2)
If contract is ambiguous, its meaning
turns on underlying intent of parties, and
intent is question of fact to be determined
by jury in light of language of entire agree
ment, parties' conduct, course of prior negotiations, and other extrinsic information.
4. Appeal and Error <3=>842(8)
District judge's determination that limited partnership agreement was ambiguous
with respect to whether limited partner
was required to furnish $750,000 or only
$400,000 of that amount to fulfill obligation
was subject to free review on appeal.
5. Contracts ^143(2)
Contract is ambiguous, as matter of
law, if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations.
6. Mines and Minerals <3=>99(2)
Limited partnership agreement was
ambiguous with respect to whether limited

partner was required to furnish full $750,000 to fulfill his phase I obligation or only
to furnish $400,000, with the remainder of
the $750,000 to be furnished for phase I to
be derived from revenues from leaching of
silver from tailings and dumps above
ground.
7. Mines and Minerals @=>99(2)
Evidence supported determination that
parties intended limited partnership agree
ment to impose upon limited partner obligation only to furnish $400,000 during
phase I, with remaining $350,000 for phase
1 to come from operation leaching silver
from tailings and dumps above ground.
8. Trial <3=>352.5(1)
Compound interrogatories to jury are
discouraged.
9. Trial <s=>352.,5(4)
Compound interrogatory to jury was
properly focused to inquire into intent of
parties to limited partnership agreement
regarding limited partner's capital contribution requirement for phase I.
10. Mines and Minerals <3^99(2)
General partner could not attack issue
of whether limited partner had satisfied his
capital funding obligation on theory that
some of the money furnished was used in
leaching operation instead of in underground mining development, where general
partner determined manner in which money
received from limited partner would be
used, and limited partnership agreement
contained no provision depriving limited
partner of credit against his investment
obligation if general partner choose to use
money for one aspect of development rather than another.
11. Pleading <s=236(3)
Trial judge had discretion to refuse to
permit general partner of limited partnership to amend counterclaim late in trial to
assert limited partner had not satisfied his
investment obligation because some of the
monies furnished were used in leaching
operation rather than in underground mining development on ground motion was untimely.

12. Mines and Minerals <s=>99(2)

Limited partnership agreement could
not be construed to entitle limited partner
to 25% partnership interest before total
investment, including any net profits from
operation leaching silver from tailings and
dumps totalled $750,000, although agreement for development of mine could be
interpreted to require limited partner to
invest only $400,000, not $750,000, during
phase I, and whether partner was immediately entitled to 25% interest based upon
his $436,000 investment accordingly should
not have been given to jury as the agreement was unambiguous on that issue.
13. Mines and Minerals <s=>99(2)

Limited partner was not entitled to
25% interest in partnership for development of mine based on his investment of
$436,000 when total investment had not
reached $750,000 on equitable grounds on
theory that risk of failure in operation for
leaching silver from tailings and dumps to
provide the remainder of $750,000 investment should be borne exclusively by general partner.
14. Mines and Minerals <3=>99(2)

provided that all advances by the limited
partners were loans.
Lloyd J. Webb (Webb, Burton, Carlson.
Pedersen & Webb), Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant.
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, Utah, and Terry R. McDaniel (Nelson, Rosholt, Robertson, Tolman & Tucker), Boise, for plaintiffrespondent.
BURNETT, Judge.
"Resolve me of all ambiguities!" This
lament of Christopher Marlowe, the sixteenth century poet-playwright, echoes in
the case now oefore us. The appeal arises
from a dispute over the language of an
agreement for development of a silver
mine. We must decide whether the agreement is ambiguous and, if so, whether the
district court properly resolved the ambiguity, giving the agreement its intended
meaning. For reasons explained below, we
affirm the district court's judgment in part,
vacate it in part, and remand the case.
I

15. Mines and Minerals <3=>99(2)

The facts essential to our opinion are
undisputed. In Box Elder County, Utah,
one mile south of the Idaho boundary, lies
a tract of land known as the Vipont Silver
Mine. From 1919 to 1923, the mine produced more than three million ounces of silver
and eight thousand ounces of gold. After
the mine was closed, heaps of "tailings"
and "dumps" remained as visual reminders
of the wealth extracted from the earth
below. Decades passed. Patented mining
claims on the property were leased by the
owner, Bannock Silver Mining Company, to
United Silver Mines, Inc., a family corporation controlled by Thomas F. Miller. As an
experienced geologist, Miller was convinced
the mine could become productive again.
He had a plan, but he needed money.

Limited partner was entitled to have
its advances to limited partnership treated
as loans, in accordance with partnership
agreement for development of mine, although total investment in phase I had not
reached $750,000 figure, as the agreement

Paul Hoffman, a venture capitalist, became interested in developing the mine.
He discussed with Miller a two-phase investment scheme. In Phase I, Hoffman
would make $750,000 available for the construction of a new tunnel and for other

Limited partner did not face prospect
of inequitable "forfeiture" if he were not
given 25% partnership interest immediately
upon investment of $436,000, before total
investment reached $750,000 figure entitling partner to 25% interest, although
partner's obligation was only to invest
$400,000; partnership agreement for development of mine treated all funds advanced
by limited partner as loans secured by lien
on general partner's interest and on partnership itself, and limited partner was not
forced to rely upon operation for leaching
silver from tailing and dumps to complete
the $750,000 investment, but could make
additional contributions.
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expenditures necessary to reactivate the
underground mining operation. In Phase
II, Hoffman would have the option of investing an additional $1,000,000 for construction of a mill to process the extracted
ores. This seemingly simple proposal became complex as details were studied and
new ideas were propounded. The negotiations took a fateful turn when the parties
discussed the possibility of leaching silver
from the "tailings" and "dumps" above
ground. The leaching operation came to be
regarded as a potential source of funds for
the underground mining project. As the
parties attempted to define the role of the
leaching operation in financing the Phase I
development, they created doubt about
Hoffman's responsibility to contribute
$750,000 of his own money during that
phase. The seeds of ambiguity were sown.
One draft agreement yielded to another
in a negotiating process that consumed several months. Ultimately, the parties
signed a sixteen-page agreement establishing a limited partnership for development
of the Vipont Silver Mine. Pertinent excerpts of that agreement are set forth in
the appendix to this opinion. The agreement, supplemented by a contemporaneous
"financing agreement," provided that Miller's corporation, United Silver Mines, Inc.,
would be the general partner and that
Hoffman would be a limited partner. The
general partner would manage the partnership's business while the limited partner
would supply money.
In its broad outline, the limited partnership agreement adhered to the parties'
original concept of a two-phase investment,
the first consisting of $750,000 and the
second (at Hoffman's option) consisting of
$1,000,000. With respect to Phase I, the
agreement provided that Hoffman would
furnish $100,000 to obtain ownership of the
leased mining claims; that Hoffman would
transfer another $25,000 into a partnership
bank account; and that Hoffman would
make an additional $275,000 available, as
needed, for work in progress. These payments would total $400,000, leaving a balance of $350,000 to be invested in Phase I.
With respect to this balance, the agreement
attempted to integrate Hoffman's invest-

ment obligation with the utilization of revenues expected from the leaching operation.
Unfortunately, the agreement did not
speak with one voice on how this integration would be achieved. In some provisions, the agreement suggested that the
$350,000 balance would come entirely from
the leaching operation, leaving Hoffman
with no obligation in Phase I beyond providing the initial $400,000. At section 2.2,
certain language derived from earlier
drafts, indicating that the limited partner
had agreed to provide $750,000, was deleted. In its place, the parties inserted a
hand-written reference to section 3.2 of the
agreement. Section 3.2(d) stated that
"[t]he balance of $350,000 needed to complete financing of Phase I is to come from
revenues retained by the partnership from
the processing of the tailings and dumps on
the Vipont Silver Mine property, as further
described in Section 4.1
" At section
4.1, the agreement provided that the limited partner would be entitled to an 80%
share of the net profits from the leaching
operation, but that this share would be
retained by the partnership until the $350,000 investment balance had been funded.
In other provisions, however, the agreement suggested that Hoffman had an ultimate responsibility for making the entire
$750,000 investment in Phase I, even if the
leaching operation did not produce the anticipated net profits. In section 2.2, where
the parties had deleted a reference to Hoffman's responsibility for $750,000, the parties allowed other language to remain
which stated that Hoffman would "provide
and/or arrange for financing in the amount
of $1,750,000" for Phases I and II combined. Section 3.2 similarly recited that the
limited partner "agree[d] to provide and/or
arrange for financing in the amount of
$1,750,000 in order to assure that the partnership will have sufficient funds available
to mine and process ores extracted from
the Vipont Silver Mines." Moreover, section 4.1(b), authorizing retention of the limited partner's 80% share of net profits from
the leaching operation until $350,000 had
been obtained, described this procedure as

a method "to assist in financing the Phase
I development
" (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the agreement was subject to varying interpretations of the relationship between the limited partner's investment in
Phase I and the net profits anticipated
from the leaching operation. The agreement was more clear, however, in its expression of the partnership's obligation toward the limited partner. The partnership
was required to give the limited partner
short-term and long-term consideration for
his investment. The short-term consideration was set forth in sections 3.2(f) and
3.2(g) of the agreement. The limited partner's advances of money were characterized as "loans," secured by a "lien" on the
general partner's interest and on the partnership itself. The "loans" were repayable
with interest "equal to one percentage
point above the prime interest rate
"
As explained in section 4.2, such repayment
would be made by allocating to the limited
partner 80% of the net revenues from the
underground mining development and 80%
of the net profits of the leaching operation
(after $350,000 had been retained for the
Phase I development).
The long-term consideration for the limited partner's investment was described in
section 4.3 of the agreement. The limited
partner would receive 25% of the partnership's future net revenues after the
"loans" had been repaid. Section 4.3 stated that the limited partner would be "entitled" to this "25% interest in the partnership as soon as the Phase I development
has been completed through the expenditure of the $750,000 which will be required
therefor." l Similarly, section 9.5 stated
that "[i]n the event Phase I is completed
. . . the limited partner shall be entitled to a
25% interest
" Thus, the agreement
1. Section 4.3 further provided that the limited
partner would receive an additional 25% interest if he participated fully in Phase II, requiring
an expenditure of $1,000,000. The same section
went on to say that if the limited partner furnished or arranged for total financing less than
the total of $1,750,000 for Phases I and II, his
future interest would be "decreased proportionately" from the 50% he otherwise would have
been entitled to receive. Although this language
raises a question of whether the limited partner
might be entitled to some fractional interest

plainly contemplated that Phase I would be
completed, and the limited partner's entitlement to a 25% interest would arise, only
when the expenditure of $750,000 had occurred. On this point, sections 4.3 and 9.5
were consistent with section 3.2, which defined Phase I as "[t]he period of time during which the initial $750,000 . . . is being
spent
"
Thus, the agreement was clear in one
respect but unclear in another. It was
clear in its delineation of the limited partner's rights upon completion of Phase I.
But it was unclear on whether his obligation during that phase was to invest
$750,000, or to invest $400,000 with the
other $350,000 coming from the leaching
operation. Despite this imperfection, the
agreement was signed and the partnership
began to develop the Vipont Silver Mine.
Hoffman contributed approximately $436,000 to the partnership. The general partner, United Silver, used some of this money
to start the leaching operation. The revenues derived from that operation were disappointing. Although the record does not
show precisely what revenues were generated, nor whether any such revenues were
"net" after deduction of costs, it is undisputed that the leaching operation had fallen short—by the time this case was tried—
of providing sufficient net profits to bridge
the gap between Hoffman's investment of
$436,000 and the Phase I requirement of
$750,000.
When problems in the leaching operation
became apparent, Hoffman requested more
detailed reports on the partnership's activities. Dissatisfied with the reports received, he demanded access to the partnership's books. When United Silver, as the
general partner, did not comply, Hoffman
even if he made a contribution of less than
$750,000 for Phase I, Hoffman has made no
such argument in this litigation. He appears to
accept an interpretation of section 4.3 which
makes the proportionate reduction language applicable only to a contribution of less than
$1,000,000 in Phase II. With respect to the 25%
interest available for Phase I, Hoffman's position is that he has fully performed his obligation
by furnishing more than $400,000. He has
made no claim to any proportionately decreased
share based on partial performance.
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brought this suit. He asked the court to
compel a full accounting; to grant access
to the partnership's books; to award damages for denial of access to those books;
and to declare that he had fully performed
his obligation in Phase I, entitling him to a
25% interest in the partnership. The general partner counterclaimed, alleging that
Hoffman had breached an obligation to furnish $750,000. The general partner sought
damages for the alleged breach and a declaration that Hoffman was entitled to nothing from the partnership.
The district court held that the limited
partnership agreement was ambiguous
with respect to Hoffman's obligation during Phase I. The judge tendered the issue
to a jury upon special interrogatories. As
we will explain more fully in the next part
of this opinion, the jury determined that
Hoffman was entitled to a 25% interest in
the partnership upon furnishing $400,000.
The district court entered judgment upon
the verdict, declaring Hoffman to be the
owner of a 25% interest and awarding him
other relief. This appeal followed.

whether the limited partnership agreement
was ambiguous, as the district court held;
and, if so, (b) whether the question of interpretation was properly put to the jury and
ultimately reflected in the judgment. We
will discuss these issues in turn.
A
The parties have presented a full spectrum of arguments on the issue of ambiguity. United Silver contends that the contract was not ambiguous—that it clearly
required the limited partner to furnish the
entire $750,000 investment in Phase I, regardless of the results obtained from the
leaching operation. Accordingly, United
Silver urges that it should have received a
directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. In contrast, Hoffman argues that if the agreement indeed was unambiguous, it clearly
required him only to provide $400,000 in
Phase I. Both parties also argue, in the
alternative, that if the agreement was ambiguous, the evidence of intent favored
their respective positions.

II
As we turn to the issues, we acknowledge the extraordinary burden this litigation has placed upon the parties, their counsel and the district court. For nearly five
years, the case went through extensive discovery, a host of pretrial proceedings, a
jury trial and numerous post-trial motions.
On appeal, the attorneys filed more than
200 pages of briefs (excluding appendices),
containing a virtual cyclopedia of legal
principles governing the construction of
contracts, jury verdicts and special interrogatories. Despite this remarkable effort
by counsel, we believe the appeal may be
decided on just two dispositive issues: (a)

[1-3] Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law.2 E.g., DeLancey
v, DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32
(1986). If the contract is not ambiguous,
its interpretation is another question of
law, to be determined by the trial judge
rather than by a jury. E.g., Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d
337 (1984). Conversely, if a contract is
ambiguous, its meaning turns on the underlying intent of the parties. Intent is a
question of fact, to be determined by a jury
in light of the language of the entire agreement, the parties' conduct, the course of
prior negotiations, and other extrinsic information. Olmstead v. Heidelberg Inn,
Inc., 105 Idaho 774, 673 P.2d 76 (Ct.App.

2. In the discussion which follows, we rely upon
principles of Idaho law and cite Idaho authorities. In so doing, we are not unmindful of
provisions in the limited partnership agreement
indicating that laws of other states might be
applicable. At section 1.1, the agreement recites
that the limited partnership is formed pursuant
to the Utah Limited Partnership Act. The agreement further states, at section 10.4, that during
Phase I the agreement shall be construed and
enforced according to the laws of the State of

Illinois. Nevertheless, the limited partner chose
to bring this lawsuit in Idaho, presumably because the general partner—United Silver Mines,
Inc., controlled by Thomas F. Miller—has its
principal office in Oakley, Idaho. Neither of
the parties has argued that Utah or Illinois law
is materially different from Idaho law with respect to the issues addressed in today's opinion.
Indeed, Hoffman's counsel has described the
choice of law issue as "academic." Consequently, we do not tarry over it.
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1983); Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 647
P.2d 814 (Ct.App.1982).
[4-6] Here, as we have noted, the district judge deemed the limited partnership
agreement to be ambiguous with respect to
whether the limited partner was required
to furnish the full $750,000, or only $400,000 of that amount, in order to fulfill his
obligation in Phase I. This determination
of ambiguity is subject to free review on
appeal. Clearwater Minerals Corp. v.
Presnell, 111 Idaho 945, 729 P.2d 420 (Ct.
App.1986). A contract is ambiguous, as a
matter of law, if it is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations.
Rutter v.
McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135
(1980); Newman v. Associated Systems,
Inc., 107 Idaho 922, 693 P.2d 1124 (CtApp.
1985). In Part I of this opinion, we have
identified two varying interpretations that
might have been given to the language in
the limited partnership agreement which
attempted to integrate the limited partner's
investment with the utilization of net profits from the leaching operation. Both of
these interpretations are reasonable. Accordingly, we uphold the district judge's
ruling that the agreement was ambiguous
on this point. The judge properly tendered
the issue to the jury for a determination of
the parties' underlying intent.
[7] During the trial, the individuals who
negotiated the agreement—Hoffman and
Miller—testified at length regarding the
purposes of the limited partnership and the
significance of particular words chosen or
deleted from the final draft of the agreement. In addition, an attorney (other than
present counsel for the parties) testified as
to his participation in the drafting process.
He presented copies of several "marked
up" drafts depicting the evolution of the
agreement. We need not recount the evidence in detail here. It is sufficient to say
that the record contains substantial evidence in support of the jury's determina3.

United Silver further contends that because
this error was contained in a compound interrogatory, it infected the jury's determination of
the limited partner's obligation. Thus, United
Silver asks us to order a new trial due to a
"failure of the adjudicatory process." We are
not persuaded that the error had such sweeping

tion that the parties intended to impose
upon the limited partner an obligation only
to furnish $400,000 during Phase I, the
remaining $350,000 to come from the leaching operation. The jury's verdict on that
point will not be disturbed.
B
[8-11] A more subtle and troubling
question is whether this determination by
the jury constituted a sufficient basis for
the district court to enter a judgment declaring that Hoffman had become the owner of a 25% interest in the partnership.
The trial judge evidently treated this 25%
entitlement as an automatic and immediate
consequence of Hoffman's performance of
his obligation—as determined by the jury—
to furnish $400,000 in Phase I. Indeed, the
jury made that determination in response
to a special interrogatory which combined
the issues of performance and entitlement
to a percentage share of the partnership:
As you, the jury, interpret the Limited
Partnership Agreement (Exhibit P-5),
was the plaintiff Paul Hoffman entitled
to a 25% interest in the Limited Partnership upon his lending to the Limited Partnership the sum of $400,000, with the
remaining $350,000 anticipated to complete "Phase I" of development of the
mine to come from funds generated and
retained by the partnership through the
leaching operation?
The jury answered "yes" to this compound
question. United Silver now contends that
the performance and entitlement questions
should have been framed separately, as
United Silver had suggested in its requested jury instructions and interrogatories.
In any event, United Silver argues, the
judge erred by equating performance of
the $400,000 investment obligation with an
immediate entitlement to a 25% interest in
the partnership.3
effect. We acknowledge that compound interrogatories are discouraged.
See generally
Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144
(1976). However, jury instructions and interrogatories must be examined as a whole. Eg.,
Zolber v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712 P.2d 525
(1985). Having done so in this case, and having
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[12] As we have explained, the limited
partnership agreement dealt separately
with the limited partner's obligation in
Phase I and the limited partner's entitlement upon completion of that phase. Although the agreement was not clear on the
first issue, it was clear on the second. It
stated that the limited partner would be
entitled to the 25% interest "as soon as the
Phase I development has been completed
through the expenditure of the $750,000
which will be required therefor." Thus,
although the agreement could be interpreted—as the jury found—to permit an outlay
of $400,000 by the limited partner during
Phase I, it could not be construed as entitling him to a 25% interest before the total
investment, including any net profits from
the leaching operation, totaled $750,000.
On this point, the agreement was unambiguous. Therefore, with all due respect to
the district court, we hold that the judge
erred in giving the immediate entitlement
issue to the jury. The error was merely
exacerbated by framing the issue in a compound interrogatory. The error subsequently was replicated in the court's judgment upon the verdict, declaring Hoffman
to be the present owner of a 25% interest
based upon his payment of at least $400,000 during Phase I.

be upheld on "equitable" grounds. He
urged that the risk of failure in the leaching operation should be borne exclusively
by the general partner and that an immediate entitlement to the 25% interest would
avoid a "forfeiture" of Hoffman's $436,000
investment.

[13] During oral argument on appeal,
Hoffman's counsel acknowledged with
commendable candor that the agreement
did not provide an immediate entitlement to
a 25% interest for an investment of at least
$400,000 but less than $750,000. Characterizing this as a "hiatus" in the contract,
counsel argued that the judgment giving
Hoffman a present interest of 25% should

[14] Neither are we persuaded that the
limited partner faces the prospect of an
inequitable "forfeiture" if he is not given
an immediate 25% interest. As mentioned
earlier, the agreement treats all funds advanced by the limited partner as "loans,"
secured by a "lien" on the general partner's interest and on the partnership itself.
Moreover, the limited partner is not forced

viewed the instructions and interrogatories in
the context of the evidence at trial, we believe
the jury's determination regarding the $400,000
obligation was properly focused on the issue of
the parties' intent.
United Silver also has attacked the compound
interrogatory from another direction, arguing
that it failed to frame yet another issue—whether, if Hoffman's obligation in Phase I was to
furnish only $400,000, he actually fulfilled that
obligation since some of the money was used in
the leaching operation rather than in the underground mining development. This attack is illfounded. United Silver, as the general partner,
determined the manner in which money re-

ceived from the limited partner would be utilized. The limited partnership agreement contained no provision depriving the limited partner of credit against his investment obligation if
the general partner chose to use the money for
one aspect of the development rather than another. Moreover, we note that United Silver did
not present this issue below until it moved to
amend its counterclaim late in the trial. The
trial judge denied that motion, deeming it to be
untimely. The ruling was well within the
judge's sound discretion. See generally Cougar
Bay Company, Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 597
P.2d 1070 (1979).

We disagree. By using the term "hiatus," counsel implies that the agreement is
flawed by a void, or discontinuity, which
must be filled by an equitable remedy. We
perceive no such flaw. There is nothing
illogical about an agreement which allows
the limited partner to rely on the leaching
operation to fund part of the $750,000 investment but which still requires the entire
$750,000 to be attained before the limited
partner receives his 25% long-term interest.
Of course, there is a risk that funds derived from the leaching operation will be
inadequate or will be realized more slowly
than the limited partner would prefer.
However, the agreement does not make the
general partner a guarantor of the leaching
operation's performance. At section 4.1,
referring to the "tailings" and "dumps,"
the agreement describes the leaching operation as a process of "recovering minerals
which may be contained therein." (Emphasis added.)
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to rely upon the leaching operation to complete the Phase I investment. He is at
liberty to make additional contributions,
which also will be treated as lien-secured
loans, in order to reach the $750,000 figure.
Indeed, the agreement provides at section
4.1(d) that the limited partner, "at his discretion/' may advance money to supplement the cash flow from the leaching operation. Hoffman's election not to make
such further advances may be a sound
weighing of business risks on his part, but
it triggers no equitable entitlement to a
25% interest in the partnership at a time
earlier than the contract clearly provides.
[15] Therefore, although we sustain the
district court's determination that it is permissible for the limited partner to invest
$400,000 in Phase I, leaving the balance of
$350,000 to be funded by the leaching operation, we also hold that any entitlement to
a 25% long-term interest in the partnership
must await the completion of Phase I
through an aggregate investment of $750,000. That portion of the district court's
judgment which declares Hoffman presently to have "a twenty-five percent (25%)
ownership interest in [the] partnership" is
hereby set aside. The district court is instructed to modify the judgment on remand. The remainder of the judgment—
denominating funds advanced by the limited partner as "loans," ordering a formal
accounting and periodic audits of the partnership's books, and awarding $1,500 in
damages for earlier denial of access to the
books—is affirmed.4 No costs or attorney
fees are awarded on appeal.

day of April, 1977, by and between UNT
ED SILVER MINES, INC., a Utah Corp
ration, (hereinafter referred to as the "Geeral Partner"), and PAUL HOFFMAN,
resident of the State of Indiana, (hereii
after referred to as the ''Limited Partner"
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section 1.1—Formation of Partnership
The parties hereto hereby form a Limite
Partnership pursuant to the provisions o
Utah Code Annotated 48-2-1 et sea
(1953) and in accordance with the prov:
sions of this Agreement, which organiza
tion is referred to herein as the "Partner
ship".
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section 2.1—Purposes and Powers of tht
Partnership:
The general purpose of the Partnership
shall be to invest in, explore for, and en
gage in the business of mining silver anr
other ores, principally on property locatec
in the State of Utah, known as the Viponi
Silver Mine.
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section 2.2—Expenditure of Capital:

EXCERPTS FROM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT
This Agreement of Limited Partnership,
entered into and effective as of the 30th

The primary purpose of the Partnership
is the business of mining silver and other
ores, the milling and processing of the extracted ores, and the sale of the end products of the milling and processing operations primarily on property located in the
State of Utah, known as the Vipont Silver
Mine, which is covered by a "Mine Lease"
which is to be contributed to the Partnership by the General Partner, as described
hereinafter. It is contemplated that the
Limited Partner will provide and/or arrange for financing in the amount of
$1,750,000.00 in order to assure that the
Partnership will have sufficient funds
available for such mining and processing.
The manner in which this financing is to be
provided is set forth in further detail hereinafter and in a separate agreement enti-

4. United Silver has questioned the treatment of
Hoffman's advances to date as loans. However,
the agreement states that "all" advances by the
limited partner are loans. The agreement does
not state that the advances must total $750,000

before any of them constitutes a loan. We have
examined other issues raised by United Silver,
and we deem them either to be without merit or
to be answered by the analysis contained in this
opinion.

WALTERS, C.J., and SWANSTROM,
J., concur.
APPENDIX
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APPENDIX—Continued
tied "Financing Agreement". The period
of time during which the initial $750,000.00
(which the Limited Partner has agreed to
provide or assure is available) See 3.2. by c,
d. P.H. T.F.M. [handwritten alteration by
parties] is being spent shall be referred to
as "Phase I" and the period during which
the final $1,000,000.00 (which the Limited
Partner has agreed to provide and/or arrange for) is being spent shall be referred
to as "Phase II".
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section 3.2—Contribution by Limited
Partner:
The Limited Partner agrees to provide
and/or arrange for financing in the amount
of $1,750,000.00 in order to assure that the
Partnership will have sufficient funds
available to mine and process ores extracted from the Vipont Silver Mine.
a) Immediately upon the signing of this
Agreement the Limited Partner agrees to
transfer to the Partnership 2,150,000
shares of stock in Bannock Silver Mining
Company which it has acquired. The parties agree that for purposes of this Agreement the 2,150,000 shares of Bannock stock
shall be valued at $100,000.00.
b) Also upon the signing of this Agreement the Limited Partner agrees to transfer $25,000.00 into a Partnership bank account and to thereafter replenish the bank
account balance monthly to this level in
order to provide working capital for the
venture.
c) Thereafter, at the times and under the
circumstances set forth in the Financing
Agreement which is being executed this
same date, the Limited Partner agrees to
provide and/or arrange for $275,000.00 as
required in purchasing equipment and supplies and providing working capital for the
Partnership.
d) The balance of $350,000.00 needed to
complete the financing of Phase I is to
come from revenues retained by the Partnership from the processing of the tailings
and dumps on the Vipont Silver Mine property, as further described in Section 4.1 of
this Agreement.

e) The parties contemplate that Phase I
will be completed sometime in 1978. Upon
the completion of Phase I, the Limited
Partner has an option for ninety (90) days
to provide and/or arrange for additional
financing in the amount of $1,000,000.00 in
order to complete the Phase II development
of the Vipont Silver Mine. If the additional
$1,000,000.00 in financing is not provided
and/or arranged for within the ninety (90)
day period, the Limited Partner loses all
right to participate in the Phase II development. The conditions and circumstances
under which the contribution of this additional financing will occur are further set
forth in the Financing Agreement which is
being executed this same date.
f) All contributions to the Partnership by
the Limited Partner shall be regarded as
loans, to be repaid in accordance with Section 4.2 hereof. Each loan shall bear interest on the unpaid balance of principal at a
rate which is equal to one percentage point
above the prime interest rate as determined
by the First National City Bank of New
York at the time that the loan is made.
g) In order to secure the repayment of the
contributions of the Limited Partner as provided for hereinabove, the Limited Partner
shall be entitled to hold and claim a lien
upon the interest of the General Partner
and the Partnership in the Vipont Silver
Mine property and upon any minerals produced therefrom until the contributions
have been fully repaid.
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section lf.1—Sharing of Net Revenues
from Processing of Eristing Tailings and
Dumps:
There are presently tailings and dumps
on the Vipont Silver Mine property which
the parties anticipate processing for the
purpose of recovering minerals which may
be contained therein. All net revenues realized from the processing of existing tailings and dumps (gross revenue less the
costs which may be properly allocated to
processing these tailings and dumps) shall
be divided and applied as follows:
a) 20% to the General Partner.
b) 80% to be retained by the Partnership to
assist in financing the Phase I development

APPENDIX—Continued
until a total of $350,000.00 has been retained.
c) After the Partnership has retained
$350,000.00 the balance of the 80% share
shall go to the Limited Partner to be applied to loans which he has made to the
Partnership or, in the discretion of the Limited Partner, to be used for additional mine
development.
d) The parties agree that underground
mine development will not begin until sufficient processing of the tailings and dumps
has occurred that, in the judgment of the
Partners, the monthly production rate from
the processing of the tailings and dumps
can be determined. Once determined, if
the status and prospects for the processing
of the tailings and dumps are favorable (i.e.
reasonably close to projections set out in a
geological report on the Vipont Silver Mine
by Thomas F. Miller dated February 10,
197_), the Limited Partner, at his discretion, agrees to advance money for the underground development in the event that
the cash flow from the processing of the
tailings and dumps does not keep up with
the costs of the underground development.
Section lf.2—Repayment of Loans Made
by the Limited Partner:
If as a result of the underground development of the Vipont Silver Mine which is
anticipated by the parties hereto commercial ore is recovered, the loans made to the
Partnership by the Limited Partner shall be
repaid out of the net revenues realized
(gross revenues less all costs and expenses,
direct or indirect, which may be properly
allocated to the mining, milling and marketing of said ores). All such net revenues
shall be divided 20% to the General Partner
and 80% to the Limited Partner until the
loans made by the Limited Partner to the
Partnership have been fully repaid.
Section 4-3—Sharing of Net Revenues
from Underground Operations After the
Loans Made by the Limited Partner Have
Been Repaid:
At such time as the loans made by the
Limited Partner to the Partnership have

been repaid, additional net revenues (gross
revenues less all costs and expenses, direct
or indirect, which may be properly allocated to the mining, milling and marketing oi
said ores) shall be divided 50% to the General Partner and 50% to the Limited Partner. This assumes that the Limited Partner has provided or arranged for the full
$1,750,000.00 to be made available to the
Partnership to enable it to complete the
Phase I and Phase II development. It is
understood and agreed that the Limited
Partner shall be entitled to a 25% interest
in the Partnership as soon as the Phase I
development has been completed through
the expenditure of the $750,000.00 which
will be required therefor. The Limited
Partner shall be entitled to an additional
25% interest as soon as the Phase II development has been completed through the
expenditure of the $1,000,000.00 which will
be required therefor. To the extent that
the Limited Partner provides and/or arranges for financing in an amount less
than $1,750,000.00 his share of the net revenues shall be decreased proportionately
from the 50% that he will be entitled to
receive if the entire $1,750,000.00 is provided and/or arranged for in accordance with
Section 3.2 hereof.
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section 9.5—Election by Limited Partner
Not to Participate in Phase II:
In the event that Phase I is completed
and the Limited Partner is unable or elects
not to provide and/or arrange for the financing needed to complete Phase II, the
parties agree that the following shall occur:
a) The lien of the Limited Partner provided
for by Section 3.2(g) shall continue until the
loans made by the Limited Partner to the
Partnership have been repaid;
b) The Limited Partner shall be entitled to
receive 100% of the net revenues from the
tailings and dumps and 80% of the net
revenues from the mine production until
his loans have been repaid;
c) Thereafter the Limited Partner shall be
entitled to a 25% interest in the Partnership
as provided for in Section 4.3.
*
*
*
*
*
*
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Section 10.1—Entire Contract:
This Agreement constitutes the entire
contract between the parties and there are
no other or further agreements outstanding not specifically mentioned herein. By
execution of this Agreement, the parties
adopt all of the provisions of this Partnership Agreement.
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section 104—Place of Contract:
During Phases I and II the parties agree
that this Agreement is performable in the
State of Illinois and shall be construed and
enforced according to the laws of the State
of Illinois in the courts of that State.
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George C. SQUIRE, Jr. and Nancy
Squire, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

EXCHANGE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a New York Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
No. 17505.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
April 19, 1989.
Petition for Review Denied
July 11, 1989.

discharged contractual obligations to insured by promptly acknowledging, investigating, and paying, based upon good-faith
evaluation, insured's claim, and thus was
not liable for bad-faith claim adjustment.
Affirmed.
Insurance 6»602.5
Fire insurer discharged contractual obligations to insured by promptly acknowledging, investigating, and paying, based
upon good-faith evaluation, insured's claim,
and thus was not liable for bad-faith claim
adjustment; payment delays were attributable to coverage questions which were
"fairly debatable."
Darrel W. Aherin, Aherin & Rice, Lewiston, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bruce R. McAllister, Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, for defendant-respondent.
HART, Judge Pro Tern.
INTRODUCTION
This action arose after a fire damaged
appellant George Squire's office. Squire
was the beneficiary of a fire insurance
policy issued by respondent Exchange Insurance Company. Squire and his wife,
Nancy, and Bernie Rakozy, their bankruptcy trustee, alleged in their complaint that
Exchange failed to properly adjust and pay
their claim.1 Squires sought damages
against Exchange under the theories of
breach of contract and bad faith claim adjustment; they also sought punitive damages.

Insured under fire policy brought action against insurer for bad-faith claim adjustment and breach of contract. The
Third Judicial District Court, Payette County, G.L. Weston, J., granted summary judgment for insurer on bad-faith claims, and
insured appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Hart, J. pro tern, held that fire insurer

Exchange moved for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted Exchange's motion and entered an order dismissing Squire's claims for bad faith claim
adjustment and for punitive damages. The
district court certified its order as final and
Squires' perfected this appeal. Squires argue that the district court erred, as genu-

1« Although Rakozy appeared as a plaintiff in
this action, he did not participate in this appeal.
The record does not disclose whether Rakozy is
still a real party in interest or whether his

claims have been settled. For the purpose of
this appeal only, we have deleted his name from
the caption of the case.

775 P 2d—5

i&'jiaf*

Portions of
Affidavit of Ray G. Martineau re Costs and Attorneys Fees
(pages R. 1432-46 and 1462-92 are omitted)

Research and study; preparation of
correspondence, pleadings re motion for
partial summary judgment
02-22-85

Iws

02-25-85

lws

02-26-85

lws

7.00>
ffTooy^

4.30

Review Hoffman file; research re marketable title
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; preparation of memo in opposition to motion %for
summary judgment; preparation of amended
complaint
Preparation of amended complaint and
discovery

02-27-85 rgm

CO^)

Preparation of motion to strike and supporting memorandum, request for oral
argument and memorandum in opposition to
motion for partial summary judgment;
research and study

02-27-85

lws

C2.00

Research memo in opposition to summary
judgment

03-01-85

lws

5.30

03-04-85

lws

.50

03-08-85

rgm

1.50

Preparation of amended complaint; review
of title documents

03-09-85

rgm

2.50

Preparation of amended complaint, second
set of interrogatories and second request
for production of document

03-10-85

rgm

5.00

Preparation of amended complaint, second
set of interrogatories and request for
production of documents

03-11-85

rgm

7-00

Telephone calls Tom Slaughter, Gary
Packer; preparation of amended complaint,
second set of interrogatories, and
request for production of documents;
research re title documents and
encumbrances

03-12-85

rgm

8.50

Telephone calls Gary Packard, Lloyd Webb,
Judge Call; preparation of amended
complaint, second set of interrogatories

Telephone calls Robert Anderson; preparation of amended complaint
Proof of amended complaint

-8-

and request for production of documents;
research and study
03-12-85

lws

Conference Ray G. Martineau

03-13-85

tvc

Review of agreements and correspondence
re rights and ownership

03-13-85

lws

Research legal status of dumps and
tailings

03-14-85

rgm

03-14-85

tvc

03-14-85

lws

03-15-85

rgm

03-15-85

tvc

03-18-85

tvc

Review of documents

03-19-85

tvc

Review of documents

03-20-85

lws

03-21-85

ska

03-21-85

lws

6.00

Preparation of interrogatories and
request for admissions

03-25-85

tvc

33,

Review of documents and cross reference
lists and sources

03-26-85

lws

4.00

Proof and review of interrogatories

Preparation of amended complaint, second
set of interrogatories and request for
production of documents; research and
study of partnership, contract and title
issued
J.5_0_
50

Hl^/Z.

Cj^ooJ)

6.50

Review of title and contract documents;
Review of amended complaint
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Tom
Slaughter; preparation, filing and service of amended complaint; preparation of
second set of interrogatories and request
for production of documents; research of
partnership and dump ownership issues and
related matters
Review and analysis of documents re
agreement between Dore and United,
depositions, correspondence, etc.

Preparation of interrogatories
Legal research and analysis of damages

-9-

03-28-85

tvc

3.00

Review of draft of second set of
interrogatories; preparation of schedule
of legal fees and costs to date

03-29-85

tvc

1.50

Review of interrogatories

^——r-

4.0CL
03-29-85

ska
1.50

04-01-85

rgm
.25

04-01-85

tvc

Legal research and analysis and preparation of memo re measure of damages for
breach of agreement to loan money
Telephone calls Tom Slaugftter; review of
interrogatories and request for production of documents, request for admissions
Discussion Leslie Slaugh re interrogatories and request for production of
documents

3.00

Preparation of interrogatories, request
for production of documents

04-01-85

lws

04-02-85

rgm

1.50

Preparation of interrogatories, request
for production and request for admissions

04-02-85

lws

6_JH

Research status of dumps and tailings

04-03-85

rgm

2.00

Preparation of interrogatories, request
for production and requests for
admissions; telephone calls Lloyd Webb

04-03-85

ska

04-03-85

lws

04-04-85

rgm

04-04-85

lws

3.00

Preparation of memo re status of dumps
and tailings

04-10-85

rgm

2.00

Telephone calls Gary Packard, Robert
Anderson; preparation of second round of
discovery

.50^
0 0 ^

Preparation of memo re damages for
failure to extend line of credit
Research re status of dumpings and
tailings; preparation of requests for
production of documents
Preparation of interrogatories, request
for production, request for admissions,
securing abstract of title to mining
claims; research and study

-10-

04-11-85

rgm

4.50

Telephone calls Gary Packard, Robert
Anderson; preparation of second set of
interrogatories, second request for production of documents and request for
admissions; preparation of correspondence
and related matters

04-12-85

lws

1.40

Preparation and review discovery requests

04-15-85

lws

4.00

Preparation and review of discovery
requests; review answers and counterclaim

04-19-85

rgm

2.25

Telephone calls Gary Packerd, Robert
Anderson; research and study re motion
for partial summary judgment; preparation
of second set of interrogatories, request
for production of documents

04-23-85

lws

04-26-85

lws

Vl.00

04-29-85

rgm

(^1.25^)

Telephone calls Gary Packard, Judge Call;
preparation of motion re hearing on
motion for summary judgment; research

04-30-85

rgm

C^TTJT)

Preparation of motion for extension of
time, memorandum, and correspondence

04-30-85

lws

05-02-85

lws

.50

05-03-85

rgm

2.00

05-03-85

lws

.50

Review of reply to counterclaim

05-06-85

rgm

(^25

Telephone calls Gary Packard, Robert
Anderson, Lloyd Webb; preparation of
response to United's motion for partial
summary judgment

05-13-85

tvc

5.50

Review memo in support of motion for summary judgment
Review status of Dumps

Preparation of motion for extension of
time and supporting memo
Preparation of counterclaim
Telephone calls Judge Omer Call, Gary
Packard; preparation of response to United?s motion for partial summary judgment

Review of files; preparation of analysis
and comparison of billings for work done
on the Vipont confirmation project
-1 1-

14 50

Preparation of memorandum in opposition
to motion for summary judgment; research
and study
05-14-85

tvc

6.00

Analysis and comparison of billings and
review

05-15-85

tvc

4.00

Review of file; preparation of summary
and analysis

05-16-85

tvc

6.00

Continued review and summary of file

05-17-85

tvc

1.00

Conference Leslie W. Slaugh re analysis
and review

05-17-85

lws

.75

05-21-85

rgm

(^f^zE^

05-21-85

tvc

1.75

05-21-85

lws

05-22-85

tvc

05-22-85

ska

05-22-85

lws

05-23-85

rgm

05-23-85

tvc

2.00

05-23-85

lws

(3TS)

05-24-85

lws

7.00

Conference
Preparation of response to motion for
summary judgment
Review of accounting questions re documentation for charges by United to Dore
Review partnership agreement

C4T5OJ

Organize file for correspondence in chronological order and raailgrams extending
option
Obtaining limited partnership certificate
from court clerk

6.60^

Research re concurrent covenants and performance; preparation of statement of
facts
Preparation of response to United's
motion for summary judgment; research and
study
File organization
Review of documents and file; preparation
of statement of facts
Review of partnership agreement; review
of Idaho case; preparation of statement
of facts

-12-

1451

( ^ • ^ ^ l &?

05-28-85

rgm

05-28-85

lws

Ql.OOy

05-29-85

lws

C 6.5JXX

05-30-85

rgm

(FlOO^y

05-30-85

lws

(3-00/

Tele

P h o n e calls Robert Anderson; review
of answers to interrogatories and
response to request for admissions;
research and study; preparation of
response to motion for partial summary
judgment; review of contractual obligations; preparation of correspondence and
option extension mailgrams

Preparation of memo in opposition to summary judgment
Telephone calls Harold Hintze; preparation of memo in opposition to summary
judgment; review answers to interrogatories
Preparation of response to United's
motion for partial summary judgment;
research of ownership of dumps and
tailings, Utah partnership act
Proof and review of memo in opposition to
summary judgment

06-03-85

lws

(^2.00)

Proof of memo re summary judgment

06-04-85
06-10-85

lws
rgm

(TfoO^)
C?i£5^/2.

Review of memo re summary judgment
Preparation of motion for partial summary
judgment and memo; review of answers to
interrogatories and accompanying documents

06-10-85

lws

06-11-85

rgm

C?'^2x

Preparation of memorandum in opposition
to motion for partial summary judgment;
preparation of plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment

06-12-85

rgm

QLi^^

Telephone calls Robert Anderson, Lloyd
Webb; review of Hoffman case files; preparation and review of correspondence;
preparation of Dorers motion for partial
summary judgment and memorandum in
opposition to United's motion for partial
summary judgment

.30

Telephone calls Lloyd Webb re production
of documents; review exhibits to answers
to interrogatories

-13-

1452

0 6-12-85

lws

Preparation of memo in opposition to
motion for summary judgment

06-13-85

lws

Review of memo re summary judgment

06-14-85

lws

Preparation of memo re summary judgment

06-19-85

rgm

Preparation of memo in opposition to
motion for partial summary judgment

06-19-85

lws

Preparation of correspondence to Thomas
Church; Review memo re summary judgment

06-21-85

rgm

d 3 )

06-25-85

rgrn

(j_Ji^

06-26-85

rgm

06-26-85

lws

06-27-85

lws

06-28-85

rgm

07-01-85

rgm

(3D

07-01-85

tvc

1.50

Review Documents produced by defendant

07-02-85

tvc

2.00

Review documents produced by United

07-04-85

rgm

(±75)

07-15-85

lws

Review UnitedTs response to request for
production

07-16-85

lws

Research costs plus contract law

07-17-85

lws

Preparation of memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment

CP
C^soy

(USD
GD

Preparation of memo in opposition to
motion for partial summary judgment
Research and study of Hoffman file and
title records to mining property
Preparation of memorandum in opposition
to United?s motion for partial summary
judgment
Research re effect of breach of contract
Research re burdens of proof
Telephone calls Lloyd Webb, Robert
Anderson; review United documents
Conference Robert Anderson

Telephone calls Robert Anderson, Tom
Church, Judge Omer Call, Lloyd Webb; preparation of correspondence; preparation
for Hearing on Unitedfs motion for partial summary judgment

-14-

1458

Telephone calls Tom Church, Robert
Anderson; Preparation of memorandum re
opposition to United!s motion for summary
judgment; Preparation of affidavit of L.
Robert Anderson
Preparation of memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; review
of correspondence; preparation of affidavit of Robert Anderson; preparation of
memorandum in opposition to motion for
partial summary judgment
Research re patents issued
Preparation of memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; preparation of motion for partial summary
judgment and supporting memorandum; preparation of affidavit of L. Robert
Anderson; study
Evaluation of Bureau of land management;
research on patents; research obtaining
documents at bus express office
Conference With Ray G. Martineau
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; preparation of motion for partial summary
judgment and supporting memorandum and
affidavit
Preparation of memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment; telephone
calls Robert Anderson
Telephone calls Robert Anderson, Judge
Omer Call's secretary; preparation of
motion for partial summary judgment;
motion for leave to file oversize brief
Preparation of motion for summary
judgment, motion for leave to file oversize memorandum
-15-

1454

Preparation of audit letter

07-29-85

ska

.25

07-30-85

rgm

2.25

Telephone calls Coopers & Lybrand, Tom
Church, Judge Call's secretary; research
and study

07-30-85

ska

1.25

Preparation of correspondence; review of
files

07-31-85

ska

.25

08-22-85

rgm

08-26-85

rgm

08-28-85 rgm

Research
Telephone calls Lloyd Webb; Review
pleadings

^TTooJ

dUlD

Review responsive pleadings from Dore and
preparation of correspondence; preparation for hearing in pending motions
Review UnitedTs pleadings; preparation
for hearing on pending motions
Review UnitedTs memorandum on motion for
summary judgment

08-28-85

lws

08-30-85

rgm

<^2,

Review Unitedfs response; study

09-03-85

rgm

C2.0Q,

Preparation of reply memorandum in
response to United?s opposing memorandum;
preparation for hearing; research and
study

09-03-85

lws

Preparation of reply to United's memorandum in opposition to summary judgment;
telephone calls Robert Anderson; preparation motion to strike portions of
Miller's affidavit

09-04-85 rgm Q T ^ F )

Telephone calls and conferences Tom
Slaughter, Judge Omer Call, Reed
Hadfield; preparation of reply memorandum to United!s response to motion for
summary judgment; research and study;
preparation for hearing

09-04-85

lws

Preparation motion to strike

09-05-85

lws

.iuoo.

Telephone calls Harold Hintze; review
stock certificates

-16-

09-06-85

rgm

09-06-85

lws

Preparation of affidavit of Harold Hintze

09-11-85

rgm

Telephone calls Tom Slaughter, Gary
Packard; research and study; preparation
for hearing on pending motions

09-11-85

lws

Preparation of reply memo

09-12-85

rgm

Preparation of reply to Unitedfs response
to pending motions

09-12-85

lws

09-13-85

Cf-"^)

(T._ooJ)

rgm

lws

09-17-85

rgm

09-17-85

lws

09-18-85

rgm

09-18-85

lws

09-24-85

rgm

09-24-85

lws

09-25-88

rgm

09-27-85

rgm

Preparation reply memorandum
Telephone calls Judge Omer Call, Tom
Slaughter; Preparation of Slaughter and
Hintze affidavits

(TToJ)
09-13-85

Telephone calls Tom Slaughter; preparation of reply to UnitedTs response to
pending motions; study

Preparation of reply memorandum in support of summary judgment; telephone calls
Lloyd Webb

(JTOJP

Telephone calls Tom Slaughter; preparation of reply to United's response to
pending motions

G.2_o)

Preparation of reply memorandum in support of summary judgment; preparation of
Slaughter affidavit

QjS)
1.001

Preparation of affidavits for Tom
Slaughter and Harold Hintze
Preparation of affidavit of Thomas
Slaughter
Telephone calls Tom Slaughter, Hugh
Shurtleff; review Tom Slaughter affidavit; study

c2D

Review and correct affidavit of Thomas
Slaughter
Preparation and filing affidavits

(j.00^)

Review United's response to Dore's motion
to strike Miller affidavit; preparation
of correspondence
-17-

1436

09-30-85

lws

C^y*

10-10-85

rgm

C2fc>

Telephone call Bill Wortman, Robert
Anderson, Judge Omer Call's secretary,
Box Elder Countv Sheriff; preparation for
hearing on pending motions

02-25-86

rgm

(jToO^)

Telephone calls Judge Omer Call's secretary , Lloyd Webb; setting over date for
oral argument on pending motions for summary judgment; study

02-26-86

rgm

frjj)

02-27-86

rgm

^2.00

Preparation for hearing on pending
motions

03-03-86

rgm

V2.00

Preparation for hearing on pending
motions for summary judgment

03-04-86

rgm

(^jOo)

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb,
re settlement proposals; preparation for
hearing on pending motions for summary
judgment

03-05-86

lws

^50J

03-06-86

rgm

(jToo)

03-07-86

lws

<5£>

Review and analysis of summary judgment
memorandums in preparation for hearing

03-07-86

rgm

(i«°0j

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb;
preparation for hearing on pending
motions; research and study

03-08-86

rgm

1.00.

03-10-86

ska

Research and analysis re updating
memorandums

03-10-86

lws

Telephone calls Tom Church; preparation
for hearing

Preparation of correspondence

Telephone calls Bill Workman and Tom
church; review of pending motions for
summary judgment and supporting
memorandum

Review and analysis of summary judgment
memorandums to prepare for hearing
Preparation for hearing on pending
motions

Preparation for hearing on pending
motions

-18-

1457

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb,
Tom Church, Robert Anderson, Judge Omer
Call!s secretary; review and communication of settlement proposals; preparation for hearing on pending motions
03-11-86

ska

Research and analysis re updating
memorandums and evidence

03-11-86

lws

Review and analysis of file in preparation for hearing on motion for partial
summary judgment

03-11-86

rgm

5.50.

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Tom Church;
preparation for hearing on pending
motions

03-12-86

lws

(JLJ^

Preparation for and attendance at hearing
on motion for partial summary judgment;
preparation of letter to Judge Call re
deposition

03-12-86

rgm

7.00

Preparation for and attendance at hearing
before Judge Omer Call on pending motions
for summary judgment; Telephone calls
Bill Wortman

03-25-86

rgm

50

04-09-86

lws

Review and analysis of ruling on motions
for summary judgment

04-09-86

tvc

Telephone calls Gloria Wilson re
transcripts

04-09-86

rgm

^ 2.00

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Robert
Anderson, Tom Church; review of Judge
Callfs memorandum decision; preparation
of correspondence; preparation of findings and order

04-14-86

rgm

(^J.25^

Preparation of findings and order

04-21-86

lws

Preparation of partial summary judgment
and order

04-22-86

lws

Review, edit and finalize form of partial
summary judgment

Preparation of correspondence requesting
copy of transcript of court hearing;
Telephone calls court reporter

-19-

14

04-22-86

rgm

(TTsjT)

04-29-86

lws

C£>

04-29-86

lws

04-30-86

rgm

2.50,

Review and analysis of motion for partial
summary judgment; research and study;
preparation of order granting partial
summary judgment and order on motion for
partial summary judgment

05-01-86

lws

1.00/

Preparation of order specifying
undisputed facts

05-02-86

lws

05-05-86

lws

(2.00.

05-06-86

lws

©

05-07-86

lws

QsoJ

05-07-86

rgm

C3S)

05-22-86

rgm

J.75

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb;
preparation of correspondence; review of
court orders; study

06-02-86

lws

C2.50J

Review and analysis of motion to amend
findings and judgment

06-02-86

rgm

1.25

Telephone calls Bill Wortman; review of
motion re modification of partial summary judgment; preparation of correspondence; study

Telephone calls Tom Church, Robert
Anderson; preparation of order granting
partial summary judgment
Preparation of order for partial summary
judgment
Review, edit and finalize order granting
partial summary judgment

Preparation of order specifying
undisputed facts
Preparation of statement of uncontroverted facts and conclusions of law
Review, edit and finalize statement of
uncontroverted facts and conclusions of
law
Review, edit and finalize statement
determining undisputed facts and conclusions of law
Preparation of order determining
uncontroverted facts and conclusions of
law and order on motions

-20-

14

Research and preparation of memorandum in
opposition to motion to amend findings
06-09-86

lws

5.00

Preparation of memorandum in opposition
to motion to amend findings

06-09-86

rgm

(dD

Telephone calls Bill Wortman; preparation
of response to United's pending motion

06-10-86

lws

3.50

Review, edit and finalize memorandum in
opposition to defendant's motion to amend
findings

06-10-86

kjs

1.00

Review and analysis of motion to strike
and memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for reconsideration

06-11-86

lws

06-11-86

kjs

06-11-86

rgm

Preparation of motion to strike

06-12-86

lws

Review, edit and finalize memorandum in
opposition to motion to amend findings

06-17-86

rgm

1.50

06-25-86

lws

.50

Review and analysis of special verdict
from Hoffman action; preparation of
letter to judge Call

06-25-86

rgm

1.25/

Telephone calls Tom Church, Robert
Anderson; Review of Hoffman decision;
preparation of correspondence

07-10-86

rgm

J^O.

07-16-86

rgm

Preparation of motion to strike motion to
amend findings; review, edit and finalize
memorandum in opposition to motion to
amend findings and in support of motion
to strike
1.00

Review, edit and finalize memorandum in
opposition to motion for reconsideration

Telephone calls Judge Call's secretary;
Lloyd Webb; setting over hearing date;
preparation for hearing on United's
motions

Research and study; preparation for oral
argument on pending motions
Scheduling hearing on pending motions

-21-

1460

Telephone calls Tom Church; preparation
for hearing on all pending motions

(Too)

Preparation for hearing on all pending
motions

07-22-86

rgm

07-23-86

rgm

07-23-86

lws

( 1.40.

Preparation for hearing

08-13-86

rgm

^3-50

Telephone Call Judge Call's secretary,
Tom Church, Lloyd Webb, Harold Hintze;
preparation for hearing on pending
motions

08-14-86

rgm

CSQ)

Telephone calls Tom Church, Harold
Hintze, securing jury instructions in
Hoffman case; preparation for hearing on
pending motions; research

08-18-86

rgm

08-19-86

rgm

08-28-86

rgm

J.50

08-29-86

rgm

dD

09-02-86

rgm

,50

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Tom Church;
review of settlement possibilites

09-15-86

rgm

50

Telephone calls Tom Church, Lloyd Webb re
settlement possibilities

10-01-86

rgm

.25

Telephone calls Tom Church re status of
Idaho matter

10-03-86

rgm

.25

Telephone calls Tom church re status of
Idaho matter

(

2.00

Telephone calls judge Call's secretary,
Tom Church; preparation for hearing on
pending motions

Telephone calls and conferences Tom
Church, Lloyd Webb, Harold Hintze;
research and study; preparation for and
attendance at hearing on pending motions
Q\oo)

Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Tom Church,
Harold Hintze; reorganizing files
Telephone calls Pam Hunt, Tom Church,
Leslie Slaugh; review and transmittal of
court's memorandum decision and order
Review and preparation of correspondence
re Idaho judgment

-22-

1431

APPENDIX

"K"
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Defense of Counterlaim
DATE

2-22-85
2-25-85
2-26-85
2-27-85
3-1-85
3-04-85
3-08-85
3-09-85
3-10-85
3-11-85
3-12-85
3-13-85
3-14-85
3-15-85
3-18-85
3-19-85
3-20-85
3-21-85
3-25-85
3-26-85
3-28-85
3-29-85
4-1-85
4-2-85
4-3-85
4-4-85
4-10-85
4-11-85
4-12-85
4-15-85
4-19-85
4-23-85
4-26-85
4-29-85
4-30-85
5-2-85
5-3-85
5-6-85
5-13-85
5-14-85
5-15-85
5-16-85
5-17-85
5-21-85

5-22-85 1

$125.00

$80.00

1.50

7.00
3.50

$45.00

Other
$40.00

$125.00

$80.00

$45.00

$40.00

3.50
4.30

3.25

2.00
5.30
.50
1.50
2.50
5.00
7.00
8.50
4.00

3.25
2.25

1.50
3.50
7.00
6.75
3.50

3.25
2.25

.25
.50

6.50
6.00

2.50
3.50

4.00
4.00

1.25

6.00
2.00
3.00

1.50
1.50
2.00
1.25
2.00
4.50

.50

3.00

3.00
1.50
.25

2.00

1.40
4.00
1.00

1.25
.50
1.00

1.25
1.25

1.10
.50
.50

2.00
2.25
1.25

1
2.75

2.00
6.6.00 4.50

.50
1

.75

5.50
6.00
4.00
6.00
1.00
1.75

Defense of Counterlaim
DATE

$125.00

$80.00

$45.00

1.50

6.50
7.00
7.00
6.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
1.25

2.00

5-23-85 1
5-24-85
5-28-85
5-29-85
5-30-85
6-3-85
6-4-85
6-10-85
6-11-85
6-12-85
6-13-85
6-14-85
6-19-85
6-21-85
6-25-85
6-26-85
6-27-85
6-28-85
7-01-85
7-2-85
7-4-85
7-15-85
7-16-85
7-16-85
7-18-85
7-22-85
7-23-85
7-25-85
7-26-85
7-29-85
7-30-85
7-31-85
8-22-85
8-26-85
8-28-85
8-30-85
9-3-85
9-4-85
9-5-85
9-06-85
9-11-85
9-12-85
9-13-85
9-17-85
9-18-85 1

2.25
2.00

2.00
4.25
1.25
.75
1.50
.75

Other
$40.00

$125.00

$80.00

$45.00

$40.00

1
2.25
1
1
1.00

1.50
.30
3.00
3.6.00

.30

1

6.50
5.00

.75
.50

1.50
2.0

1.75
1.50
1.50
3.25
3.75
6.25
.75

5.00
5.25
3.10
5.00
.50
8
.10

2.50
3
.25

2.25
.50

2.00
1.50
2.50
2.00
5.25

1.00

1.25
1.00
.50
1.25
3.00

4.40
4.00
.50
2.00
4.00
1.00
1.00
1.20

.75

1.00

2

1.25
.25

Defense of Counterlaim
DATE

$125.00

$80.00

9-24-85
9-25-85
9-27-85
9-30-85
0-10-85

1.25

.10

2 - 2 5 - 8 6 11
2-26-86
2-27-86
3-3-86
3-4-86
3-5-86
3-6-86
3-7-86
3-8-86
3-10-86
3-11-86
3-12-86
3-25-86
4-09-86
4-14-86
4-21-86
4-22-86
4-29-86
4-30-86
5-1-86
5-2-86
5-5-86
5-6-86
5-7-86
5-22-86
6-2-86
6-6-86
6-9-86
6-10-86
6-11-86
6-12-86
6-17-86
6-25-86
7-10-86
7-16-86
7-21-86
7-22-86
7-23-86
8-13-86

1.00
1.50
2.00
2.00
2.00

$45.00

Other
$40.00

$125.00

.50

1.00
.10
.75

1

.50
1.00
2.00
1.00
3.25
5.50
7.00
.50
2.00
1.25

.30
5.50
5.75

1.50

1.40
.75
1.50

.50

.50

4.00
5.25
.10

2.50

1.50
1.75
1.25
.75
.50
1.50
1.25
1.50
.25
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.50

1.00
2.00
2.00
.50
.50
2.50
6.00
5.00
4.50
3.20
.50
.50

1.40
3

$80.00

$45.00

$40.00

Defense of Counterlaim
DATE

8-14-86
8-18-86
8-19-86
8-28-86
8-29-86
TOTALS

$125.00

$80.00

$45.00

151.50 277.70

28.85

Other
$40.00

$125.00

$80.00

$45.00

$40.00

3.50
6.25
1.00
1.50
• 50
1 9 . 7 5 || 4 9 . 5 0

4

40.50

40.30

4.25

